

# Debian Security Team presentation

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Pass the Salt 2018





# Introduction



# Who am I?

## Yves-Alexis PEREZ (Corsac)

Debian developer

- ▶ **team security member**
- ▶ package maintainer
  - ▶ Xfce desktop environment
  - ▶ strongSwan IKE/IPsec daemon
  - ▶ Linux kernel team member

ANSSI head of software and hardware architecture lab

Mostly interested in low-level security and hardening



# Agenda

## Security team presentation

- People

- Roles

- Tools

## Workflows

- Security frontdesk

- Debian Security Advisory

## Vulnerabilities

- Embargos

## Examples

- KRACK

- Meltdown/Spectre

- Standard embargoed vulnerability: pcs



# Security team presentation



# People

## Core team members

- ▶ ~10 people[1]
- ▶ ~5 really active

## Other people involved

- ▶ Debian developers and maintainers
- ▶ Security researchers



# What we do

## Handle security for stable releases

- ▶ keep watch over security issues in stable/oldstable
- ▶ issue Debian Security Advisories (DSA)
  - ▶ prepare packages updates
  - ▶ upload to the security archive
  - ▶ send the DSA mail for `debian-security-announce@`
- ▶ coordinate with other teams and developpers

## Other interests

- ▶ distribution hardening
  - ▶ reduces workload later on



# What we don't do

## Everything else security related

- ▶ Debian infrastructure: the *other* DSA<sup>1</sup>
- ▶ Debian accounts: DAM<sup>2</sup> and Keyring teams
- ▶ Debian LTS<sup>3</sup>

- 
1. Debian System Administrators, unfortunate acronym collision
  2. Debian Accounts Managers
  3. Long Term Support





# Frontends

## Communication

- ▶ `security@debian.org` (PGP `rsa4096/0x6BAF400B05C3E651`)
- ▶ `debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org`
- ▶ `irc://irc.debian.org/#debian-security`

## Security tracker: <https://security-tracker.debian.org/>

- ▶ sysadmin/enduser oriented
- ▶ web interface for browsing
- ▶ search by package, vulnerability (CVE) or suite

## Data: useful for automated vulnerability assessment

- ▶ CVE list (raw[2] / json[3])
- ▶ OVAL json [4]



# Backends

## security-tracker

Public[5] git repository

- ▶ team organization
- ▶ CVE management
- ▶ DSA assignment
- ▶ source for security-tracker website

## sec-private

Private git repository

- ▶ management of embargoed issues
- ▶ some internal data



# Workflows



# Security frontdesk

## Contact point for security issues

Make sure:

- ▶ someone is always present and active
  - ▶ we don't miss important issues
  - ▶ we distribute the load amongst the team
- 
- ▶ *Anyone* can do this, but make sure *someone* actually does it
  - ▶ nowadays not formally done



# Duties

## Day to day routine

- ▶ watch over the mail alias and process incoming requests
- ▶ watch over oss-sec and distros (private) lists, external sources
- ▶ add private issues to the private git repository
- ▶ add public issues to the security-tracker (data/CVE/list)
- ▶ process *External check*
- ▶ submit bug reports for public issues to the BTS
- ▶ add new DSA-worthy issues to the list (dsa-needed.txt)

Distributed amongst the team



# External check

## What is it?

- ▶ automated script
- ▶ runs once a day
- ▶ finds newly assigned CVEs from various sources MITRE, vendors/upstream etc.
- ▶ adds them to `data/CVE/list` with TODO tag

## Post processing TODO entries

- ▶ is it against a Debian package?
- ▶ is the affected version in a Debian supported release?
- ▶ what is the severity?
- ▶ are there external sources of information?

Add enough information to the tracker to facilitate work later on



## Releasing a DSA[6]

1. vulnerability is identified
2. CVE is assigned (helpful, not required)
3. fix is identified
4. patch is applied against package in supported suites
5. package is built locally
6. package is uploaded to security-master
7. package is built by the buildbots
8. package is released to the security mirror network
9. DSA mail is sent

### Usually

- ▶ work is shared between team members
- ▶ some steps can be done externally



# Vulnerabilities





## Three major types of vulnerability

### public vulnerability (vast majority)

- ▶ reported via oss-sec, public bug or commit
- ▶ fix already known or developed in the open
- ▶ integrated in Debian as soon as possible
- ▶ usually no rush

### simple private vulnerability

### complex private vulnerability

- ▶ multiple codebases
- ▶ multiple vendors
- ▶ protocol vulnerability
- ▶ hardware vulnerability



## Embargos

- ▶ vulnerability not known publically (*under embargo*)
- ▶ only small circle of people know about it

## Usage

- ▶ give some time to developers to find a fix
- ▶ coordinated date for publication
- ▶ everybody publish at the same time
- ▶ all users protected

## High profile examples

- ▶ ROCA (Debian not affected)
- ▶ KRACK (wpa)
- ▶ Meltdown/Spectre (Linux, hypervisors, microcode)



## In practice

### Embargos have many drawbacks

- ▶ fix availability delayed
- ▶ few people aware mean fix might not be optimal or even broken
- ▶ indefinite embargo problem (hide stuff below the carpet)
- ▶ leak problem

### Limit usage as much as possible

- ▶ for simple vulnerabilities
- ▶ short duration



# Operating system distribution security contact lists

`linux-distros@vs.openwall.org`[7]

- ▶ restricted list for open-source distributions (Linux and \*BSD)
- ▶ successor to vendors-sec
- ▶ maintained by Openwall with help from distributions
- ▶ anyone can report a vulnerability privately
- ▶ strict policy (14 days max embargo, 7 days preferred)



# Examples



# KRACK

## Standard embargoed vulnerability

- ▶ coordination with community (upstream, researchers...)
- ▶ fix preparation
- ▶ coordinated release

## Key Reinstallation attacks[8]

- ▶ multiple vulnerabilities in the WPA *protocol*
- ▶ discovered by Mathy Vanhoef (imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven)
- ▶ involves multiple vendors (access points and clients)
- ▶ in Debian: wpa source package (wpa\_supplicant and hostapd)



# Timeline

- 28/08 initial contact from CERT
- 10/10 second contact from CERT
- 10/10 upstream contact on the restricted distribution list
- 10/10 contact wpa upstream and Debian maintainers
- 16/10 announcement and fixes publication
- 01/11 paper presentation at ACM CCS



# Initial contact (28/08/2017)

[VU#793496] WPA2 protocol vulnerabilities

File Edit View Message

Reply Group Reply Forward

**From:** CERT Coordination Center <[cert@cert.org](mailto:cert@cert.org)>  
**To:** Yves-Alexis <[corsac@debian.org](mailto:corsac@debian.org)>, Debian Security Team <[team@security.debian.org](mailto:team@security.debian.org)>  
**Cc:** CERT Coordination Center <[cert@cert.org](mailto:cert@cert.org)>  
**Subject:** [VU#793496] WPA2 protocol vulnerabilities  
**Date:** Mon, 28 Aug 2017 11:39:25 -0400 (28/08/2017 17:39:25)  
**Security:** GPG encrypted

Greetings,

We have become aware of several key management vulnerabilities in the 4-way handshake of the Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) security protocol. The impact of attacking these issues includes decryption, packet replay, TCP connection hijacking, HTTP content injection, and others. Note that as protocol-level issues, most or all correct implementations of the standard will be affected. Vendors who implement WPA2 are strongly encouraged to carefully review the attached report and proofs of concept.

The CERT/CC and the reporting researcher, Mathy Vanhoef (contact information below), will be publicly disclosing these issues on 16 October 2017. CERT welcomes and encourages your self-assessments and official statements for representation in our vulnerability note. Note that vendors we do not hear from will be listed as 'unknown' in our published document.

We are tracking this case as VU#793496. Please retain VU#793496 in the subject of any email replies.

Please note that this notification may be redundant to ICASI members. ICASI members have been working with the researcher to discuss fixes and compatibility issues under its member NDA. To enable collaboration across the community, ICASI welcomes the engagement of nonmembers into these discussions. For further information on how you can engage with ICASI on this, please contact Scott Algeier, ICASI's Executive Director, at [scott@icasi.org](mailto:scott@icasi.org) or 703-385-4969.

You are also welcome to reach out to the researcher, Mathy Vanhoef <[Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be](mailto:Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be)>, with technical questions about the vulnerabilities or proofs of concept. His PGP key may be found here:

<http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?search=Mathy.Vanhoef%40cs.kuleuven.be&op=index>

2 Attachments (885,6 kB) Save All





# Initial contact (28/08/2017)

## Summary

- ▶ coordination done by CERT.org
- ▶ full details, paper and proof of concept in the notification



# Upstream contact (10/10/2017)

[vs] VU#228519 and wpa\_supplicant/hostapd

File Edit View Message

Reply Group Reply Forward

**From:** Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>  
**To:** [distros@vs.openwall.org](mailto:distros@vs.openwall.org)  
**Subject:** [vs] VU#228519 and wpa\_supplicant/hostapd  
**Date:** Tue, 10 Oct 2017 23:08:56 +0300 (10/10/2017 22:08:56)  
**Security:** GPG encrypted

plain text document attachment (msg-28317-2.txt)

VU#228519 (a generic issue related to reinstallation of IEEE 802.11 RSN/WPA keys) applies to a number of implementations including wpa\_supplicant and hostapd. The following security advisory will be published October 16, 2017. This addresses the issues applicable to wpa\_supplicant/hostapd.

I'm providing this early notice to the distros list since hostapd and/or wpa\_supplicant packages are included in many of the distros on the list and while some of you may have received information about this from CERT, I'm not sure whether everyone has and there may be desire to prepare for releasing updated packages in time the issues become public.

Please let me know if you have any feedback or questions regarding the draft advisory or if you would like to receive the patches referenced at the end of the document before the publication date.

- Jouni

---[ EMBARGO NOTE START ]-----  
- This is an \*UNPUBLISHED DRAFT\* and subject to change  
- Do \*NOT\* distribute any details outside your organization

1 Attachment (12,3 kB) Save As



# Upstream contact (10/10/2017)

## Summary

- ▶ from Jouni Malinen, upstream author of wpa
- ▶ sent to the distribution list (open-source distributions)
- ▶ details about the protocol vulnerabilities
- ▶ impact on hostapd and wpa\_supplicant on various platforms
- ▶ patches for various branches
- ▶ later resent to oss-sec[9] (per distros list policy)



# Embargo period

## Investigate the issue

- ▶ read the announcements and the paper
- ▶ identify vulnerabilities relevant to hostapd/wpa\_supplicant
- ▶ setup a testbed to reproduce the issues

## Work with the maintainers

- ▶ integrate patches
- ▶ test-build packages for affected distributions (Sid/unstable, Stretch/stable, Jessie/oldstable)
- ▶ upload packages to security-master for builddds
- ▶ prepare advisory text



## On release date

- ▶ small embargo break: Cisco and other vendors release early
- ▶ Web and Twitter start to panic
- ▶ Mathy Vanhoef publishes the website
- ▶ Distributions start sending mail
- ▶ Packages are released



# Meltdown[10]

## Reminder

- ▶ CVE-2017-5754 (Rogue Data Cache Load)
- ▶ affects all Intel CPU with out-of-order execution (nearly all since 95), some IBM POWER, some ARM CPU
- ▶ race condition between MMU permission checks and memory access
- ▶ invisible at the architecture level but visible at micro-architecture level
- ▶ exploited by measuring access time to memory whose location depends on privileged content
- ▶ reads data from any mapped memory, bypassing permission checks
- ▶ fixed by unmapping kernel from userland (KPTI<sup>4</sup>)

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## 4. Kernel Page-table Isolation



# Spectre[11]

## Reminder

- ▶ CVE-2017-5753 (bounds check bypass, Spectre-V1)
- ▶ CVE-2017-5715 (branch target injection, Spectre-V2)
- ▶ vulnerabilities in various CPU (Intel, ARM)
- ▶ root cause is speculative execution
- ▶ like Meltdown, attacker can read data normally not accessible at her privilege level (interpreter, CPL, hypervisor)
- ▶ fixed by combined hardware (or microcode) and software changes



# Timeline

**2016** multiple researches published on side-channel and cache timing attacks

**2017** *Spectre attack vectors found by two separate teams*

**01/06/2017** *Google researchers alert Intel, AMD, ARM about Spectre*

**24/06/2017** Daniel Grass et al (TU Graz) publish “KASLR is Dead: Long Live KASLR” with KAISER patchset

**28/07/2017** *Google alerts vendors about Meltdown*

**09/2017** *Google internally deploys retpoline fix for Spectre*

**11/2017** KAISER patchset is heavily discussed on LKML, fast-tracked for 4.15

**09/11/2017** *Intel notifies some vendors under NDA (CRD 09/01/2018)*

**12/2017** Rumors (Twitter etc.) of an incoming hardware vulnerability

**03/01/2018** Google Project Zero publishes blog post, Spectre/Meltdown attack websites are up





# Debian handling

## Debian not included in embargo

- ▶ no NDA with Intel
- ▶ information only from the rumor mill
- ▶ lot of noise around KAISER/KPTI on early january
- ▶ on 03/01/2018
  - ▶ identify Meltdown and Spectre attack vectors
  - ▶ prioritize Meltdown fixes (KAISER for 4.9)
  - ▶ Spectre postponed (multiple incompatibles fixes, microcodes not released)
  - ▶ integrate kernel patches, build and test
- ▶ 04/01/2018: release kernel DSA fixing Meltdown

2018/01/03 - [16:56:46] (Corsac): but I keep thinking an arbitrary read wouldn't lead to that level of panic, and kind of fear there's a write primitive somewhere too



# pcs: pacemaker command-line interface

## Two vulnerabilities

**CVE-2018-1079** Privilege escalation via authorized user malicious REST call

**CVE-2018-1086** Debug parameter removal bypass, allowing information disclosure

- ▶ discovered by a Red Hat researcher (Cedric Buissart)
- ▶ reported through distros@
- ▶ fixes already available
- ▶ CRD on 04/04/2018 (later extended to 09/04)
- ▶ Debian stable only affected by the information leak



# Vulnerability handling

## Timeline

- 26/03 initial contact to distros@ and acknowledgment
- 26/03 information forwarded to Debian maintainer
- 27/03 maintainer prepares update, tests the package
- 30/03 maintainer uploads the package  
*package rejected because he's not a Debian developer*
- 04/04 sponsor uploads to security-master
- 09/04 stable package released, DSA mail sent
- 12/04 new upstream version uploaded to unstable



# Investigation

- ▶ simple vulnerability
- ▶ simple fix
- ▶ team work mostly coordination with maintainer
- ▶ embargo not necessarily needed but not harmful



# Conclusion



# What to bring home?

## Security team

- ▶ handles security updates for (old)stable suites
- ▶ manages the security tracker

## Not all vulnerabilities are equal

- ▶ public vs. private
- ▶ simple vs. complex
- ▶ isolated vs. multiple (cross-vendors, protocol etc.)



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