

DEXCALIBUR

AUTOMATE YOUR ANDROID APP REVERSE

Or hooking for dummies

<https://github.com/FrenchYeti/dexcalibur.git>

GEORGES-B. MICHEL

- ▶ @FrenchYeti
- ▶ yeti@0xff.ninja
- ▶ Software Security Evaluator at Thales


- ▶ Day : Reverse engineering (Android + TEE) apps
 - ▶ HCE Payment applications, Trusted Applications, ARM binaries
- ▶ Night : Develop reverse / pentest / appsec tools
 - ▶ Frida addict 




Aka @FrenchYeti

EXAMPLE OF AN OBFUSCATED ANDROID APPLICATION


LET'S IMAGINE AN OBFUSCATED MULTI-DEX APPLICATION




LET'S IMAGINE AN OBFUSCATED MULTI-DEX APPLICATION




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


WHAT CAN I HOOK ?

PACKER
CLASS LOADER
DEX LOADER

APP CLASSES
& METHODS

NATIVE
FUNCTIONS



Clear .dex file & JNI libs

DECIPHER

DECIPHER & LOAD

INVOKE BY REFLECTION

JNI FUNCTIONS

DOWNLOAD,
DECIPHER & LOAD


Ciphered secondary
.dex file

Ciphered JNI lib

Class loaded from the network
(NetworkClassLoader)

YOU CAN HOOK
ONLY WHAT YOU SEE

WHAT IS INTERESTING TO HOOK ?



IT REQUIRES SEVERAL HOOKING SESSIONS

MOTIVATION

MOTIVATION

- ▶ Deobfuscate → waste of time

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- ▶ Several devices → hooked simultaneously

MOTIVATION

- ▶ Deobfuscate → waste of time
- ▶ Manage hooks → not so easy
- ▶ Manual tasks → can be automated (start App, ...)
- ▶ Several devices → hooked simultaneously
- ▶ Application size → explore bytecode/libs is boring

CHRISTMAS WISH LIST 1/2 :

- ▶ Show **functions invoked dynamically** as « xrefs »
- ▶ Discover automatically **classes & bytecode loaded dynamically** (DexFile ..)
- ▶ **Generate hook** with a single click on the function
- ▶ **Debug a single hook** while others are active
- ▶ **Enable/disable hook** without lose or pollute the source code



CHRISTMAS WISH LIST 2/2 :

- ▶ **Multi-user** : share the same instrumentation with my friends
- ▶ Instrumente **several devices** and merge hook logs (Workflow / IoT)
- ▶ Be able to run with **rooted & non-rooted devices**
- ▶ Offer **user-friendly GUI and API**,
- ▶ **Free & open-source ! (license**  **APACHE 2)**





**WHAT IS
DEXCALIBUR ?**

WHAT IS DEXCALIBUR ?

NOT JUST A TOOLBOX

DEX DISASSEMBLER *Baksmali*

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FILE IDENTIFIERS & PARSERS

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FILE IDENTIFIERS & PARSERS

STATIC BYTECODE ANALYZER

DYNAMIC BYTECODE ANALYZER

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FILE IDENTIFIERS & PARSERS

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INSTRUMENTATION TOOL

FRIDA

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MODULAR HEURISTIC & SEARCH ENGINE

NOT JUST A TOOLBOX

DEX DISASSEMBLER *Baksmali*

FILE IDENTIFIERS & PARSERS

STATIC BYTECODE ANALYZER

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
INSTRUMENTATION TOOL

FRIDA


MODULAR HEURISTIC & SEARCH ENGINE

DEVICE MANAGER & FRIDA UTILS

NOT JUST A TOOLBOX




NOT JUST A TOOLBOX



NOT JUST A TOOLBOX

DEXCALIBUR



WHAT IS DEXCALIBUR ?

POWERED BY ... NICE TOOLS :-)





Today

**NATIVE HOOK CANNOT BE GENERATED
NO BYTECODE SYMBOLIC EXEC**

Functions contained into JNI/native libs can be hooked, but decompilers/analyzers dont support it. So, native hook cannot be generated.

WHAT IS DEXCALIBUR ?

POWERED BY ... NICE TOOLS :-)
AND MORE !



Today

**NATIVE HOOK CANNOT BE GENERATED
NO BYTECODE SYMBOLIC EXEC**

Functions contained into JNI/native libs can be hooked, but decompilers/analyzers dont support it. So, native hook cannot be generated.


Tomorrow

**ADD NATIVE LIBRARIES SUPPORT
SMALI SYMBOLIC EXEC**


DEMO #1

HOW IT WORKS ?


1) START PHASE – FILE ANALYSIS




1) START PHASE - ANDROID API ANALYSIS




1) START PHASE – APPLICATION BYTE CODE ANALYSIS




2) INSTRUMENTATION PHASE – BEFORE RUN




2) INSTRUMENTATION PHASE – BEFORE RUN




2) INSTRUMENTATION PHASE – BEFORE RUN



2) INSTRUMENTATION PHASE – RUNTIME



2) INSTRUMENTATION PHASE – RUNTIME



**« HEY !
GIVE ME THE MOST
COMPLETE PICTURE OF
THE APPLICATION »»**

DRAW A COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE APPLICATION


MIX * ANALYSIS WITH INSTRUMENTATION RESULTS

STATIC
ANALYSIS

GRAPHS


ANDROID
INTERNAL
CALLS

STATIC
VALUES




DRAW A COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE APPLICATION

MIX * ANALYSIS WITH INSTRUMENTATION RESULTS




DRAW A COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE APPLICATION

MIX * ANALYSIS WITH INSTRUMENTATION RESULTS



DRAW A COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE APPLICATION

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CASE #1

DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS

METHOD INVOKED DYNAMICALLY


```
2  const v0, 0x1
3  new-array v1, v0, [Ljava/lang/Class;
4  new-array v2, v0, [Ljava/lang/Object;
5  const v0, 0x0
6  const-class v3, Ljava/lang/String;
7  aput-object v3, v1, v0
8  aput-object p0, v2, v0
9  const-string v0, "convertToString"
10 const-class v3, Landroid/content/res/abltMZGC;
11 invoke-virtual {v3, v0, v1}, Ljava/lang/Class;->getMethod(Ljava/lang/String;[Ljava/lang/Class;)Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;
12     move-result-object v0
13 invoke-virtual {v0, v3, v2}, Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;->invoke(Ljava/lang/Object;[Ljava/lang/Object;)Ljava/lang/Object;
14     move-result-object v0
15 check-cast v0, Ljava/lang/String;
16 return-object v0
```

Smali code


From a static point-of-view only two methods are called :

- ▶ `Class.getMethod()`
- ▶ `Method.invoke()`


DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS




DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS




DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS




DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS




DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS



DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS



DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREF WITH INVOKED METHODS



METHOD INVOKED DYNAMICALLY

XRef from
com. [REDACTED].a.a.CGSuroKqvFzdyAH(<java.lang.String>)<java.lang.String>

Method	Tags	Action
java.lang.Class.getMethod(<java.lang.String><java.lang.Class>[]<java.lang.reflect.Method>	internal	Probe OFF
java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(<java.lang.Object><java.lang.Object>[]<java.lang.Object>	internal	Probe OFF

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

**BEFORE
RUNTIME**

METHOD INVOKED DYNAMICALLY

XRef from
com. [redacted].a.a.CGSuroKqvFzdyAH(<java.lang.String>)<java.lang.String>

Method	Tags	Action
java.lang.Class.getMethod(<java.lang.String><java.lang.Class>[]<java.lang.reflect.Method>	internal	Probe OFF
java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(<java.lang.Object><java.lang.Object>[]<java.lang.Object>	internal	Probe OFF

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries


BEFORE
RUNTIME

AFTER
RUNTIME

XRef from
com. [redacted].a.a.CGSuroKqvFzdyAH(<java.lang.String>)<java.lang.String>

Method	Tags	Action
android.content.res.abltMZGC.convertToString(<java.lang.String>)<java.lang.String>	invoked	Probe OFF
java.lang.Class.getMethod(<java.lang.String><java.lang.Class>[]<java.lang.reflect.Method>	internal	Probe OFF
java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(<java.lang.Object><java.lang.Object>[]<java.lang.Object>	internal	Probe OFF

UPDATE OF THE CALL GRAPH



Gray nodes have been discovered statically

Green nodes are internal Android or Java methods

Pink nodes are invoked dynamically and not discovered statically

DEMO #2

DYNAMIC UPDATE OF XREFS
WITH INVOKED METHODS


CASE #2

ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY


ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY




ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY




ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY




ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY



ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY



ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY



ANALYZE DEX FILE LOADED DYNAMICALLY

Elements discovered

 Refresh

The table below lists all elements discovered (string, class, method, field, array, ...).

-	▲	Type	Object	Action
		Class	com.████████████████████.crackme.external.DynamicClass01	more
		Class	com.████████████████████.crackme.external.packed.ProtectedClass01	more

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

CASE #3

BYTECODE CLEANER

BYTE CODE CLEANER : REMOVE NOP

```
4 nop
5
6 .line 28
7 :goto_0
8 goto/32 :goto_1
9 nop
10 nop
11 nop
12 nop
13
14 :goto_1
15 invoke-static {p0, p1}, Lcom
16
17 .line 29
18 i 32
```

BEFORE


BYTE CODE CLEANER : REMOVE NOP

```
4 nop
5
6 .line 28
7 :goto_0
8 goto/32 :goto_1
9 nop
10 nop
11 nop
12 nop
13
14 :goto_1
15 invoke-static {p0, p1}, Lcom
16
17 .line 29
18
```

BEFORE

```
1
2 goto/32 :goto_3
3
4 .line 28
5 :goto_0
6 goto/32 :goto_1
7
8 :goto_1
9 invoke-static {p0, p1}, Lc
10
11 .line 29
12 goto/32 :goto_2
13
```

AFTER



REMOVE USELESS GOTO

```

1 |
2 goto/32 :goto_7
3
4 :goto_0
5 goto/32 :goto_1
6
7 :goto_1
8 const-string v0, "9227439b7fce6139b549462
9 goto/32 :goto_3
10
11 :goto_2
12 const-string v1, "d0528d529bffba743e16802
13 goto/32 :goto_6
14
15 :goto_3
16 invoke-static/range {v0 .. v0}, LOhRHPbt
17     move-result-object v0
18 goto/32 :goto_2
19
20 :goto_4
21 invoke-static {v0, v1}, LOhRHPbtimNvzSnj
22 goto/32 :goto_5
23
24 :goto_5
25 return-void
26
27 :goto_6
28 invoke-static/range {v1 .. v1}, LOhRHPbt
29     move-result-object v1
30 goto/32 :goto_4
31
32 :goto_7
33 goto/32 :goto_0
34

```

BEFORE

REMOVE USELESS GOTO

```

1 |
2 goto/32 :goto_7
3
4 :goto_0
5 goto/32 :goto_1
6
7 :goto_1
8 const-string v0, "9227439b7fce6139b549462
9 goto/32 :goto_3
10
11 :goto_2
12 const-string v1, "d0528d529bffba743e16802
13 goto/32 :goto_6
14
15 :goto_3
16 invoke-static/range {v0 .. v0}, LOhRHFpbtimNvzSnj1;
17     move-result-object v0
18 goto/32 :goto_2
19
20 :goto_4
21 invoke-static {v0, v1}, LOhRHFpbtimNvzSnj1;
22 goto/32 :goto_5
23
24 :goto_5
25 return-void
26
27 :goto_6
28 invoke-static/range {v1 .. v1}, LOhRHFpbtimNvzSnj1;
29     move-result-object v1
30 goto/32 :goto_4
31
32 :goto_7
33 goto/32 :goto_0
34

```

BEFORE

```

1 |
2
3
4
5 const-string v0, "9227439b7fce6139b549462de29bea8ec
6
7 invoke-static/range {v0 .. v0}, LOhRHFpbtimNvzSnj1;
8     move-result-object v0
9
10 const-string v1, "d0528d529bffba743e168029bb07a8f9c
11
12 invoke-static/range {v1 .. v1}, LOhRHFpbtimNvzSnj1;
13     move-result-object v1
14
15 invoke-static {v0, v1}, LOhRHFpbtimNvzSnj1;->Bd0ZpYI
16
17 return-void
18

```

AFTER

IMPROVEMENTS

- ▶ Use my own customizable Dex Decompiler (or use LIEF)?
- ▶ Add r2 binding and native hooks
- ▶ HTTP communications & Intent grabbing
- ▶ Bytecode & native symbolic exec (Z3) ?
- ▶ Bytecode emulation (SmaliVM @CalebFenton)?
- ▶ Offers native instruction hooking (QBFI)?
- ▶ And fuzz (afl-fuzz params + feedback given by hooking)?

Thanks

Q&A

ANNEXES

HOW TO INSTALL ?

- ▶ Ensure you have the requirements (Frida, NodeJS, apktool)

```
git clone https://github.com/FrenchYeti/dexcalibur.git  
cd dexcalibur  
npm install
```

- ▶ Or install from DockerHub

```
docker pull frenchyeti/dexcalibur  
docker run -it \  
  -v <workspace>:/home/dexcalibur/workspace \  
  -p 8080:8000 --dev=<device> \  
  frenchyeti/dexcalibur
```

SEARCH BYTE ARRAY

	d.f.za.Yb.a()<int>[]::array_0		Probe
	d.f.za.a.o.<clinit>()<void>::array_0	md5 key-128	Probe
	d.f.za.yb.<clinit>()<void>::array_0		Probe
	d.f.za.yb.<clinit>()<void>::array_1		Probe
	f.d.a.b.a.<clinit>()<void>::array_0	sha1 sha256 key-256	Probe
	f.d.a.b.a.<clinit>()<void>::array_1	sha1 sha256 key-256	Probe
	f.d.a.b.a.<clinit>()<void>::array_2	ascii	Probe

Location [f.d.a.b.a.<clinit>\(\)<void>](#)

Label :array_2

Size 288 bits

Entry width 8 bits

Tag	Data	Action
ascii	Noise_XXfallback_25519_AESGCM_SHA256	

raw

```
4e 6f 69 73 65 5f 58 58 66 61 6c 6c 62 61 63 6b
5f 32 35 35 31 39 5f 41 45 53 47 43 4d 5f 53 48
41 32 35 36 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```