

Fixing NTLM decryption in Wireshark

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Staff Research Engineer



Pass the SALT 2023 Lille, France ►SEARCH►TR/01 ►03 ►SEARCH►TR/01 ►03

NTLM decryption?

- NTLM is firstly an authentication protocol
 - Old one, obsolete, many security flaws \rightarrow don't use it! (but you know, people still do...)
- But also:

"The process of authentication establishes a shared context between the two involved parties; this includes a **shared session key**, used for subsequent **signing** and **sealing** operations."

- "Signing" is... signing 😉
- "Sealing" is a fancy word for "encryption" 2



NTLM decryption?

• If you know the user's password...

→ you can obtain the shared session key...

6 you can decrypt the traffic!





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create two tasks then enum RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY.pcapng	- 0	
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Decrypted stub data	Sequence Data	
	49154 → 41722 [ACK] Seg=285 Ack=497 Win=64240 Len=0	
efdfe36ad36 671500001300000000000000130000005c0066006900720073007400		
	49154 → 41722 [ACK] Seq=285 Ack=1957 Win=64240 Len=0	
	49154 → 41722 [ACK] Seg=285 Ack=3397 Win=64240 Len=0	
6f4556d88a6 00000200130000000000000130000005c0066006900720073007400	7400610073006b0000000000 SchRpcRegisterTask response	
	41722 → 49154 [ACK] Seq=3397 Ack=397 Win=63956 Len=0	
3d4be166f4c 23a660fe80c5b38f0ac74de1d56d065b98b791a169f29c05a3f17add		
		>
		-
Frame 25: 2954 bytes on wire (23632 bits), 2954 bytes captured (2363		
Ethernet II, Src: VMware_08:66:01 (00:0c:29:08:66:01), Dst: VMware_f		
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.80.128 (192.168.80.128), D	JSC: 192.108.42.2 (192.108.42.2)	
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 41722 (41722), Dst Port: 49		
Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC)	Request, Fragment: Single, Fraglei 0050 76 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 3d 00 verrs: i-o-n-=-	
Version: 5	0060 22 00 31 00 2e 00 30 00 22 00 20 00 65 00 6e 00 "·1···0· "··e·n·	
Version (minor): 0	0070 63 00 6f 00 64 00 69 00 6e 00 67 00 3d 00 22 00 c-o-d-i- n-g-=-"-	
Packet type: Request (0)	0080 55 00 54 00 46 00 2d 00 31 00 36 00 22 00 3f 00 U·T·F·-· 1·6·"·?· 0090 3e 00 0a 00 3c 00 54 00 61 00 73 00 6b 00 20 00 >····<·T· a·5·k· ·	
> Packet Flags: 0x03		
Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, East Leasth, 2000.	(Ploat: IEEE) 000b0 22 00 31 00 2E 00 32 00 22 00 20 00 78 00 6d 00 "12." · .x.m_	
Frag Length: 2900	0000 6C 00 6E 00 73 00 3d 00 22 00 68 00 74 00 74 00 1 hrst=* "-httt 0000 70 00 3a 00 2f 00 2f 00 73 00 68 00 65 00 65 00 pttt/// stribut	ata
Auth Length: 16 Call ID: 2		ALCA
Alloc hint: 2852	0000 6d 00 61 00 73 00 2e 00 6d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 m·a·s·.· m·i·c·r· 00f0 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 2e 00 63 00 6f 00 o·s·o·f·t·.·c·o·	
Context ID: 0	00f0 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 2e 00 63 00 6f 00 orsorf traces 0100 6d 00 2f 00 77 00 69 00 6e 00 64 00 6f 00 77 00 m//wii ndoow	
Opnum: 1	0100 00 21 00 77 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 07 00 07 70 0 m//wir hotow (readable)	
[Response in frame: 28]	9120 32 00 2f 00 6d 00 69 00 74 00 2f 00 74 00 61 00 2 /·m·j· t·/·t·a.	
Encrypted stub data: db2614835d7c0be0e1f1462d61eef3a8d463f4c40675	8415588erbd-fr-28efdfe36ed36 0130 73 00 6b 00 22 00 3e 00 0a 00 20 00 3c 00 s·k·"->· · · · ·	
 Auth Info: NTLMSSP, Packet privacy, AuthContextId(79231) 	0140 54 00 72 00 69 00 67 00 67 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 Trrig gerrs	
Auth type: NTLMSSP (10)	0150 3e 00 0a 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 3c 00 43 00 >···· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Auth level: Packet privacy (6)	0160 61 00 6C 00 65 00 65 00 64 00 61 00 72 00 54 00 a-1-e-n-d-a-r-T-	
Auth pad len: 0	0170 72 00 69 00 67 00 67 00 65 00 72 00 3e 00 0a 00 r·i·g·g·e·r·>··· 0180 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 3c 00 3c 00 53 00 ·······<·<·S·	
Auth Bsrvd: 0	0100 74 00 51 00 72 00 74 00 42 00 51 00 75 00 55 00 trainit Brown	
Auth Context ID: 79231	01a0 64 00 61 00 72 00 79 00 3e 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 d.arr.y. >-2.0.1.	
✓ NTLMSSP Verifier	01b0 35 00 2d 00 30 00 37 00 2d 00 31 00 35 00 54 00 50-71-5-T-	
	Frame (2954 bytes) Decrypted NTLMSSP Verifier (12 bytes) Decrypted data (2852 bytes) Decrypted stub data (2852 bytes)	_
		Defaul






create two tasks then enum RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY.pcapng	>
<u>-</u> File <u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> apture <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics Telephon <u>y W</u> ireless <u>T</u> ools <u>H</u> elp	
(■ ∅ 0	
Decrypted stub data Sequence Data	
49154 →	41722 [ACK] Seq=285 Ack=497 Win=64240 Len=0
Befdfe36ad36… 671500001300000000000000130000005c00660069007200730074007400610073006b00… 00000000 SchRpcRe	gisterTask request
	41722 [ACK] Seq=285 Ack=1957 Win=64240 Len=0
	41722 [ACK] Seq=285 Ack=3397 Win=64240 Len=0
6f4556d88a600002001300000000000000130000005c00660059007200730074007400610073006b0000000000 SchRpcRe	
	49154 [ACK] Seq=3397 Ack=397 Win=63956 Len=0
33d4be166f4c 23a660fe80c5b38f0ac74de1d56d065b98b791a169f29c05a3f17add35c2830055674b40 01000000 SchRpcRe	gisterTask request
	>
Frame 30: 2954 bytes on wire (23632 bits), 2954 bytes captured (23632 bits) on interface eth0, id 0	▲ 0000 23 a6 60 fe 80 c5 b3 8f 0a c7 4d e1 d5 6d 06 5b #.`
Ethernet II, Src: VMware 08:66:01 (00:0c:29:08:66:01), Dst: VMware f3:9b:97 (00:50:56:f3:9b:97)	0010 98 b7 91 a1 69 f2 9c 05 a3 f1 7a dd 35 c2 83 00 ····i····z·5···
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.80.128 (192.168.80.128), Dst: 192.168.42.2 (192.168.42.2)	0020 55 67 4b 40 31 21 a6 f2 0d 1d 63 b0 87 76 f6 b8 UgK@1!····c··v··
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 41722 (41722), Dst Port: 49154 (49154), Seg: 3397, Ack: 397,	0030 30 b3 3b d0 1f de e5 10 d7 18 94 6b ae 73 11 87 0;
Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Request, Fragment: Single, Fragle	0040 d7 ee 71 eb b5 df e2 a9 48 c9 f6 f9 47 63 62 d8 ···q····· H···Gcb·
Version: 5	0050 d8 a7 23 26 20 f5 9a e9 4d a8 e3 8f a4 e3 4d 30 +#& + M
Version (minor): 0	0060 63 2e f2 95 94 26 ea 29 87 29 0c d1 07 c1 02 54 c&) ·) ·····T 0070 ce e3 cc 73 8f 04 58 29 ef 52 13 af bc e4 54 67 ···s··X) ·R····Tg
Packet type: Request (0)	0080 C2 E3 C2 / 3 0 04 53 22 E1 52 15 d1 0C E4 54 67 ·····S··A) · R····Ig
> Packet Flags: 0x03	0000 +7 du a/ 50 c5 40 50 cc 51 /2 +2 c 41 15 60 61 a
> Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, Float: IEEE)	00a0 a6 db 6b 29 22 31 e2 23 09 05 1a 18 3e 02 b9 99 ··k)"1.# ····>···
Frag Length: 2900	00b0 52 ac 3d b5 ae 11 83 6a be f6 f2 b7 25 f9 ee 64 R=j%d
Auth Length: 16	00c0 8b cf 2c af 57 c8 a5 2f 87 33 5f a0 23 1c dd 05 ···, W··/ ·3_·#···
Call ID: 3	00d0 95 d9 8d c2 ce 39 6c ec 02 43 ce d0 ef 62 f8 f6 ·····91 · C···b·
Alloc hint: 2852	00e0 eb 33 74 09 e4 62 d3 72 bc 42 ed 6b f6 76 fb 09 3t br Bkvv Decrypted data
	00f0 15 30 56 4e e/ f3 ce 12 /b c4 59 6/ 09 9/ 59 2e 00VN { Yg Y.
Context ID: 0	0100 bc 2f f8 b9 f6 82 eb cd 01 fb 32 60 eb d9 b0 c1 ./
Opnum: 1	0110 a9 2f 51 ce 31 65 b0 88 0b ec 43 08 ad 25 fa 7b /0.1e
[Response in frame: 33]	0130 93 25 d 2 9f 36 97 b5 53 22 f7 6b d1 89 f8 4f a 4f ·
Encrypted stub data: 79f59f919a13498ae337d2705b7e4fd17b8043d1268cd3d484714a0c764e33d4be166f4c	0140 dc 54 97 81 56 00 14 85 e6 7f ce f4 23 88 64 14 T.V.V#.d
✓ Auth Info: NTLMSSP, Packet privacy, AuthContextId(79231)	0150 be f2 aa bf e7 81 33 f0 8f 04 d2 ff e7 44 25 f7 D%-
Auth type: NTLMSSP (10)	0160 af 3c 4f e9 51 34 7b 74 b9 45 d0 a2 ab 5b 49 7b · <o·q4{t td="" ·e···[i{<=""></o·q4{t>
Auth level: Packet privacy (6)	0170 0d 5e 18 98 e7 00 c0 46 81 b3 a2 22 ce 10 fb 10 · ^·····F ····
Auth pad len: 0	0180 35 86 3c 43 7e fe 14 83 9b 52 8a 6f 04 e0 8f 0a 5 < C ···· R · 0 ····
Auth Rsrvd: 0	0190 1a 9c 9d 12 79 fd 47 0d 76 52 52 3f 68 94 1f 6e
Auth Context ID: 79231	01a0 99 59 7e ef 60 36 86 3b 8b 2a 62 09 db f8 8b d5 · Y~``6'; *b····· 01b0 35 87 09 80 3a 37 fd 34 9c 5e ec ef 5f 12 05 b6 5···:7·4 ·^····
✓ NTLMSSP Verifier	=
>	Frame (2954 bytes) Decrypted NTLMSSP Verifier (12 bytes) Decrypted data (2852 bytes) Decrypted stub data (2852 bytes)
🔘 🍸 create two tasks then enum RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY.pcapng	Packets: 41 · Displayed: 26 (63.4%) Profile: Default











Brain Overflow Alert:

The next section describes the NTLMv2 algorithm. It's not really that difficult, but it can get tedious--especially if your head is still swimming from the LM and NTLM algorithms. Jerry Carter of the Samba Team warns that your brain may explode if you try to understand it all the first time through. (Most veteran CIFS engineers have had this happen at least twice.)

You may want to skim through <u>section 2.8.5</u> and possibly <u>section 2.8.9</u>, which describes Message Authentication Codes (MACs). You can always come back and read them again after you've iced your cranium.

IMPLEMENTING **CIFS** The Common Internet File System





\leftarrow \rightarrow C (avenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html

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The NTLM Authentication Protocol and Security Support Provider

Abstract

This article seeks to describe the NTLM authentication protocol and related security support provider functionality at an intermediate to advanced level of detail, suitable as a reference for implementors. It is hoped that this document will evolve into a comprehensive description of NTLM; at this time there are omissions, both in the author's knowledge and in his documentation, and almost certainly inaccuracies. However, this document should at least be able to provide a solid foundation for further research. The information presented herein was used as the basis for the implementation of NTLM authentication in the open-source jCIFS library, available at <u>http://jcifs.samba.org</u>. This documentation is based on independent research by the author and analysis of functionality implemented in the <u>Samba</u> software suite.

Contents


8

 What is NTLM? NTLM Terminology The NTLM Message Header Layout The NTLM Flags The Type 1 Message Type 1 Message Example <u>The Type 2 Message</u> • Type 2 Message Example <u>The Type 3 Message</u> Name Variations · Responding to the Challenge The LM Response The NTLM Response The NTLMv2 Response The LMv2 Response The NTLM2 Session Response The Anonymous Response Type 3 Message Example NTLM Version 2 NTLMSSP and SSPI Local Authentication Datagram Authentication · Session Security - Signing & Sealing Concepts · The User Session Key The LM User Session Key The NTLM User Session Key The LMv2 User Session Key The NTLMv2 User Session Key The NTLM2 Session Response User Session Key The Null User Session Key The Lan Manager Session Key Key Exchange · Key Weakening NTLM1 Session Security. NTLM1 Key Derivation Master Key Negotiation Key Exchange Key Weakening • Signing o Sealing NTLM2 Session Security NTL M2 Kar Daris Source: https://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html





"the **same RC4 keystream is used for both signing and sealing** [...] An RC4 cipher is initialized using the previously negotiated key. This is done once (before the first signing operation), and the **keystream is never reset**."





9 Source: https://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html



Encryption by client/server

EncryptMessage(req1, keystream)
MakeSignature(req1, keystream)

EncryptMessage(req2, keystream)
MakeSignature(req2, keystream)

Decryption by Wireshark

DecryptMessage(req1, keystream)
MakeSignature(req1, keystream)

DecryptMessage(req2, keystream)
MakeSignature(req2, keystream)






Encryption by client/server

EncryptMessage(req1, keystream)
MakeSignature(req1, keystream)

EncryptMessage(req2, keystream)
MakeSignature(req2, keystream)

Decryption by Wireshark



DecryptMessage(req2, keystream)
MakeSignature(req2, keystream)





Wireshark Foundation > (a) wireshark > Merge requests > 10474

fixed in v4.0.6 backported to v3.6.14

ntlmssp: fix decrypt error by decrypting verifier after payload

🐎 Merged Clément Notin requested to merge 😵 cnotin/wireshark:pr-fix-_ 🛱 into master 2 months ago

Overview 6 Commits 1 Pipelines 11 Changes 1

Fix #19000 (closed)

As described in #19000 (comment 1357871061), the issue was that the DCERPC calls the underlying dissector (NTLMSSP in our case) first to deal with the verifier dissect_auth_verf, then to deal with the payload decode_encrypted_data. The issue is that previously, the NTLMSSP code to deal with the verifier also decrypted it. Actually it failed because it couldn't find the packet info which wasn't created yet. Then the payload was decrypted, before going to the next request. The issue is that the verifier was never decrypted, and since the same RC4 cipher is used without reset for all subsequent requests, the cipher is shifted and it doesn't decrypt properly anymore.

My suggestion here is to skip decrypting the verifier, just storing its encrypted value. Then when the payload decryption is called, decrypt it, then call the function to finally decrypt the verifier. So the verifier is always decrypted after decrypting the payload, and before decrypting the next payload from the next request.

() tenable

I'm confident about that logic, but I'm not very confident with my code unfortunately 😕, also because I don't know all the Wireshark concepts (the tree, the key, etc.) so please review it carefully 🥄 I managed to not touch the dcerpc code itself, nor any other dissector, just NTLMSSP so the impact is minimal...

Of course I confirm that the decryption of the entire RPC exchange from the PCAP shared in #19000 (closed) now works great! 🎉



Merge request pipeline #855328290 passed for 6d466cab 2 months ago



create_two_tasks_then_enum_RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY_NTLMv2_password_clem.pcapng File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

dcerpc	
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Leng	ngth Source Port Destination Port Info
4 23:17:12,519480964 192.168.80.128 192.168.42.2 DCERPC 1	166 41722 49154 Bind: call_id: 1, Fragment: Single, 1 context items: TaskScheduler
6 23:17:12,520545557 192.168.42.2 192.168.80.128 DCERPC 3	338 49154 41722 Bind_ack: call_id: 1, Fragment: Single, max_xmit: 4280 max_recv: 4
8 23:17:12,526323317 192.168.80.128 192.168.42.2 DCERPC 4	438 41722 49154 AUTH3: call_id: 1, Fragment: Single, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: cnn-lab.l
10 23:17:12,527899906 192.168.80.128 192.168.42.2 TaskSchedulerService 29	954 41722 49154 1 SchRpcRegisterTask request
13 23:17:12,553455927 192.168.42.2 192.168.80.128 TaskSchedulerService 1	166 49154 41722 SchRpcRegisterTask response
15 23:17:12,556213808 192.168.80.128 192.168.42.2 TaskSchedulerService 29	954 41722 49154 SchRpcRegisterTask request
18 23:17:12,643620795 192.168.42.2 192.168.80.128 TaskSchedulerService 1	166 49154 41722 SchRpcRegisterTask response
20 23:17:12,646182977 192.168.80.128 192.168.42.2 TaskSchedulerService 1	130 41722 49154 SchRpcEnumTasks request
22 23:17:12,648513562 192.168.42.2 192.168.80.128 TaskSchedulerService 13	302 49154 41722 SchRpcEnumTasks response
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
> Frame 10: 2954 bytes on wire (23632 bits), 2954 bytes captured (2 0000 67	7 15 00 00 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 13 00 00 00 g
	c 00 66 00 69 00 72 00 73 00 74 00 74 00 61 00 \\frac{1}{1} fir stta
	3 00 6b 00 6a 00 77 00 6c 00 70 00 6d 00 64 00 skijwilpmd
	9 00 66 00 00 ab ab 65 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 I f
 Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RP 0040 65 	5 05 00 00 3c 00 3f 00 78 00 6d 00 6c 00 20 00 e··· x·m·l·</td
 Microsoft Task Scheduler Service, SchRpcRegisterTask 0050 76 	6 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 3d 00 v•e•r•s• i•o•n•=•
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0070 63	3 00 6f 00 64 00 69 00 6e 00 67 00 3d 00 22 00 coodii ng = "
0080 55	5 00 54 00 46 00 2d 00 31 00 36 00 22 00 3f 00 U·T·F·-· 1·6·"·?·
	e 00 0a 00 3c 00 54 00 61 00 73 00 6b 00 20 00 >····<·T·a·s·k··
	6 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 3d 00 versiions
	2 00 31 00 2e 00 32 00 22 00 20 00 78 00 6d 00 ".12." · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	c 00 6e 00 73 00 3d 00 22 00 68 00 74 00 74 00 1 in s = "htt:
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	d 00 61 00 73 00 2e 00 6d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 mass. miccr
	f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 74 00 2e 00 63 00 6f 00 o s o f t . c o
	d 00 2f 00 77 00 69 00 6e 00 64 00 6f 00 77 00 m/window
	3 00 2f 00 32 00 30 00 30 00 34 00 2f 00 30 00 s / 2 0 0 4 / 0
	2 00 2f 00 6d 00 69 00 74 00 2f 00 74 00 61 00 2//miit//ta 3 00 6b 00 22 00 3e 00 0a 00 20 00 20 00 3c 00 s·k·"-><-
	4 00 72 00 69 00 67 00 67 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 Trrig gers
	e 00 0a 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 3c 00 43 00 >··································
	1 00 6c 00 65 00 6e 00 64 00 61 00 72 00 54 00 allen dar T
	2 00 69 00 67 00 67 00 65 00 72 00 3e 00 0a 00 rigg err>
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	2 00 30 00 3a 00 33 00 35 00 3a 00 31 00 33 00 2 0 · · 3 5 · · 1 3 ·
01d0 2e	e 00 32 00 37 00 35 00 37 00 32 00 39 00 34 002.7.5.7.2.9.4.
01e0 3c	c 00 2f 00 53 00 74 00 61 00 72 00 74 00 42 00
Frame (2954 bytes)	i) Decrypted data (2852 bytes) Decrypted NTLMSSP Verifier (12 bytes) Decrypted stub data (2852 bytes)

Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC): Protocol

13

Selected Packet: 10 · Packets: 26 · Displayed: 9 (34.6%)

Profile: Default

dcer	pc																*
No.	Time		Source	Destination		Protocol		Length	Source Port	Destination	Port Info	,					
	4 23:17:	12,51948096	64 192.168	80.128 192.1	.68.42.2	DCERPC		16	6 41722	49154	4 Bi	ind: cal	ll_id: 1	, Fragment: S	Single, 1	context item	s: TaskScheduler
	6 23:17:	12,52054555	57 192.168	42.2 192.3	68.80.128	DCERPC		33	8 49154	41722	2 Bi	ind_ack	: call_i	d: 1, Fragmen	nt: Single	e, max_xmit:	4280 max_recv: 4
	8 23:17:	12,52632331	17 192.168	80.128 192.3	.68.42.2	DCERPC		43	8 41722	49154	AL	JTH3: ca	all_id:	1, Fragment:	Single, M	NTLMSSP_AUTH,	User: cnn-lab.l
	10 23:17:	12,52789996	06 192.168	80.128 192.3	.68.42.2	TaskSchedu	lerServic	e 295	4 41722	49154	sc.	hRpcRe	gisterTa	sk request			
	13 23:17:	12,55345592	27 192.168	42.2 192.1	68.80.128	TaskSchedu	lerServic	e 16	6 49154	41722	sc Sc	hRpcReg	gisterTa	sk response			
	15 23:17:	12,55621386	08 192.168	80.128 192.1	.68.42.2	TaskSchedu	lerServic	e 295	4 41722	49154	2 Sc	hRpcRe	gisterTa	sk request			
				42.2 192.3										sk response			
				80.128 192.1									umTasks	And the second sec			
				42.2 192.3										response			
		12,04051550	02 102.100	42.2 272		Tubkbeneuu	101001110	- 100	2 49 294			mperm	unnuorto	response			
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				c: 192.168.										0 00 00 00 00		J. M.T.b.w.	
				Src Port: 4			+,							0 6c 00 20 00		? · x · m · 1 · ·	
				nt / Remote			/RP 0050							0 6e 00 3d 00		s· i·o·n·=·	
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														0 6b 00 20 00		T·a·s·k··	
														0 6e 00 3d 00		s· i·o·n·=·	
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							00d0							0 68 00 65 00		/· s·c·h·e·	
							00e0	6d (00 61 G	0 73 0	00 2e	00 6d	00 69 0	0 63 00 72 00	m·a·s·	. · m·i·c·r·	
							00f0	6f (00 73 Q	0 6f 0	0 66	00 74	00 2e 0	0 63 00 6 f 00	0.2.0.	f tc.o.	
							0100	6d (00 2f 0	0 77 8	0 69	00 6e	00 64 0	0 6f 00 77 00	m - / - w -	i · n·d·o·w·	
							0110	73 (00 2f 6	0 32 6	30 30	00 30	00 34 0	0 2f 00 30 00	s · / · 2 ·	0.0.4./.0.	
							0120	32 (00 2f 0	0 6d 6	0 69	00 74	00 2f 0	0 74 00 61 00	2 · / · m ·	i t / t a	
							0130	73 (00 6b 6	0 22 0	30 3e	00 0a	00 20 0	0 20 00 3c 00	s·k·"·	> · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
							0140	54 (00 72 G	0 69 6	0 67	00 67	00 65 0	0 72 00 73 00	T·r·i·	g g e r s	
							0150	3e (00 0a 0	0 20 0	00 20	00 20	00 20 0	0 3c 00 43 00		· · · < · C ·	
							0160	61 (00 6c 0	0 65 6	00 6e	00 64	00 61 0	0 72 00 54 00	a·l·e·	n· d·a·r·T·	
								72 (00 69 e	0 67 6	00 67	00 65	00 72 0	0 3e 00 0a 00	0	g· e·r·>···	
							0180	20 (00 20 G	0 20 0	00 20	00 20	00 20 0	0 3c 00 53 00		· · · < · S ·	
							0190							0 75 00 6e 00		t · B·o·u·n·	
							01a0							0 30 00 31 00		$y \cdot > 2 \cdot 0 \cdot 1$	
							0160							0 35 00 54 00		7 · - · 1 · 5 · T ·	
							0100							0 31 00 33 00		3 5 : 1 3	
							01d0							0 39 00 34 00		5 7 2 9 4	
							01e0							0 74 00 42 00		t· a·r·t·B·	
							Frame (2954	bytes)	Decrypted dat	a (2852 bytes)	Decrypte	ed NTLMSSP Verif	fier (12 bytes)	Decrypted stub data (2852 byte	es)		

Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC): Protocol

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Selected Packet: 15 · Packets: 26 · Displayed: 9 (34.6%)

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da	terpc																		*
No.	Time		s	Source	Destination		Protocol		1	Length S	ource Port	Destination P	ort Info						
	4 23:	17:12,5	19480964	192.168.80	9.128 192.1	68.42.2	DCERPC			166 4	1722	49154	Bin	d: cal	l_id: 1	, Fragment	: Single, :	1 context ite	ms: TaskScheduler
	6 23:	17:12,5	20545557	192.168.42	2.2 192.1	68.80.12	8 DCERPC			338 4	9154	41722	Bin	d_ack:	call_i	d: 1, Frag	ment: Sing	le, max_xmit:	4280 max_recv: 4
	8 23:	17:12,5	26323317 :	192.168.80	9.128 192.1	68.42.2	DCERPC			438 4	1722	49154	AUT	Н3: са	11_id:	1, Fragmen	t: Single,	NTLMSSP_AUTH	I, User: cnn-lab.l
	10 23:	17:12,5	27899906	192.168.86	9.128 192.1	68.42.2	TaskSche	dulerSe	ervice	2954 4	1722	49154	Sch	RpcReg	isterTa	sk request			
	13 23:	17:12,5	53455927	192.168.42	2.2 192.1	68.80.12	8 TaskSche	dulerSe	ervice	166 4	9154	41722	Sch	RpcReg	isterTa	sk respons	e		
	15 23:	17:12,5	56213808 :	192.168.80	9.128 192.1	68.42.2	TaskSche	dulerSe	ervice	2954 4	1722	49154	Sch	RpcReg	isterTa	sk request			
	18 23:	17:12,6	43620795 :	192.168.42	2.2 192.1	68.80.12	8 TaskSche	dulerSe	ervice	166 4	9154	41722	Sch	RpcReg	isterTa	sk respons	e		
	20 23:	17:12,6	46182977 :	192.168.80	.128 192.1	68.42.2	TaskSche	dulerSe	ervice	130 4	1722	49154	Sch	RpcEnu	mTasks	request			
	22 23:	17:12,6	48513562	192.168.42	2.2 192.1	68.80.12	8 TaskSche	dulerSe	ervice	1302 4	9154	4172:	3 Sch	RpcEnu	mTasks	response			
-																			
> F	rame 22	: 1302	bytes on	wire (104	16 bits),	1302 byt	es captur	ed (1	0000	17 00	00 00	3 17 0	0 00 0	0 00	00 02 00	17 00 00	00		
			-		(00:50:56											10 00 02			
					192.168.4											20 00 02			
					c Port: 49				0030	24 00	02 00	28 0	0 02 0	0 2c	00 02 00	30 00 02	00 \$	(,	
					/ Remote			-	0040	34 00	02 00	38 0	0 02 0	0 3c	00 02 00	40 00 02	00 4 8	3···· <···@···	
					SchRpcEnu		c carr (D		0050 4	44 00	02 00	48 00	02 0	0 4c	00 02 00	50 00 02	00 D ····	H··· L···P···	
	1101 0301	C TUSK	Scheduler	Service,	Semperne											09 00 00		(\	
																46 00 53		E-P-F-S-	
																12 00 00		a.L	
																72 00 73		···· f·i·r·s·	
																66 00 67		a s kafg	
																12 00 00		Die Viiii	
																72 00 73		firs.	
																76 00 71 12 00 00		as kBvq NT q	
																72 00 73		firs	
																63 00 44		a s k C c D	
																12 00 00		g·s·g·····	
																72 00 73		···· f·i·r·s·	
																7a 00 4c		a·s· k·c·z·L·	
									0140	68 00	41 00	61 00	8 61 0	0 44	00 00 00	12 00 00	00 h . A . a	a a D · · · · · ·	
									0150	99 99	00 00	12 00	0 00 0	0 66	00 69 00	72 00 73	00	···· f·i·r·s·	
									0160	74 00	74 00	61 00	3 73 0	0 6b	00 6a 00	77 00 6c	00 t·t·a	a s k j w l	
									0170	70 00	6d 00	64 00	8 49 0	0 66	00 00 00	12 00 00	00 p·m·c	d·I· f·····	
									0180	99 96	00 00	9 12 00	0 00 0	0 66	00 69 00	72 00 73		···· f·i·r·s·	
																48 00 54		a s k X H T	
																09 00 00		A-L- b	
																70 00 65		G·I·p·e·	
																09 00 00		<u>2.р</u>	
																70 00 72		K·N·p·r·	
_																4e 00 00 ecrypted stub data (120		D-ON	

Frame (1302 bytes) Decrypted data (1200 bytes) Decrypted NTLMSSP Verifier (12 bytes) Decrypted stub data (1200 bytes)

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