

# ZEXROOM

A LIBRARY OF ARITHMETIZATION-ORIENTED CONSTRUCTIONS FOR ZK-SNARK  
CIRCUITS

LAURENT THOENY

ANTONIO DE LA PIEDRA



PASS THE SALT 2023

- ZEKROM IS A LIBRARY FOR BUILDING PRIVACY-PRESERVING APPLICATIONS BASED ON ZK-SNARKS
- IT PROVIDES STATE-OF-THE-ART AUTHENTICATED-ENCRYPTION AND HASHING FUNCTIONS FOR ZK-APPS.
- IT RELIES ON THE RECENTLY PROPOSED SAFE API
- IT IS EASY TO EXTEND
- WRITTEN IN RUST

# AGENDA

01

WHAT ARE  
ZK-SNARKS  
?

02

HOW  
ENCRYPTION  
AND  
HASHING  
ARE USED  
INSIDE A  
ZK-SNARK ?

03

HOW CAN I  
USE ZK-  
SNARKS  
INSIDE MY  
PROJECT ?

04

ZEKROM

# 1. WHAT ARE ZK-SNARKS ?

# ZK-SNARKS

- **ZERO-KNOWLEDGE SUCCINCT NON-INTERACTIVE ARGUMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE**
- THEY ARE A POWERFUL BUILDING BLOCK FOR CREATING PRIVACY-PRESERVING APPLICATIONS. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST 7-8 YEARS
- THEY ALLOW US TO CONVINCe SOMEONE THAT A PARTICULAR STATEMENT IS TRUE WITHOUT REVEALING ANY INFORMATION ABOUT IT
- **KEY APPLICATIONS**: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE OF A PARTY NEED TO BE DEMONSTRATED

WHAT CAN WE BUILD WITH ZK-SNARKS ?

# EXAMPLES

## COMMON USE-CASES

- I KNOW THE PRE-IMAGE OF  $\text{SHA3}(M)$
- I HAVE THE SECRET KEY **SK** CORRESPONDING TO THIS PUBLIC KEY PK.
- I HAVE CORRECTLY PERFORMED THE SIGNATURE ALGORITHM USING MY SECRET KEY **SK**.
- **MY IDENTITY** IS PART OF THE LIST OF AUTHORIZED PEERS
- VALIDATION OF SOME **ATTRIBUTES** E.G. MY AGE IS  $> 18$ , I LIVE IN A SET OF VALID COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE APPLICATION, MY NAME AND SURNAME ARE WELL-FORMED.

THE SECRET VALUES ARE NEVER REVEALED

# EXAMPLES

## COMMON USE-CASES

- **I KNOW A SECRET:** I KNOW THE PRE-IMAGE OF  $\text{SHA3}(M)$
- **PROOF OF CORRECT EXECUTION:** I HAVE THE SECRET KEY **SK** CORRESPONDING TO THIS PUBLIC KEY PK. I HAVE CORRECTLY PERFORMED THE SIGNATURE ALGORITHM USING MY SECRET KEY **SK**.
- **PRIVATE AUTHENTICATION:** **MY IDENTITY** IS PART OF THE LIST OF AUTHORIZED PEERS
- VALIDATION OF SOME **ATTRIBUTES** E.G. MY AGE IS  $> 18$ , I LIVE IN A SET OF VALID COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE APPLICATION, MY NAME AND SURNAME ARE WELL-FORMED.

THE SECRET VALUES ARE NEVER REVEALED

## RECENT PROPOSALS

- PROVING THAT A CERTAIN **VULNERABILITY** EXISTS [GREEN ET AL., 2022]
- PROVING THAT **NETWORK TRAFFIC** IS ENCRYPTED ACCORDING TO POLICY [GRUBBS ET AL., 2021]
- PROVING PROPERTIES ABOUT INFERENCE **MODELS** IN MACHINE LEARNING
- FIGHTING DISINFORMATION THROUGH PROVING AN IMAGE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATIONS [BONEH ET AL., 2023]

## 2. USING AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION AND HASHING




# HASHING AND ENCRYPTION

- MANY OF THE USE-CASES REQUIRE AEAD/HASHING AS THE UNDERLYING CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVE
- HOWEVER, IN PROVING SCHEMES WE DO COMPUTATIONS WITH FIELD ELEMENTS BY DESIGN, AND MEASURE THE PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF ADD/MUL OPERATIONS IN THE COMPUTATION
- THIS MEANS THAT MANY TRADITIONAL SOLUTION (E.G. SHA2, AES) WILL NOT PERFORM WELL IN CIRCUITS. THEIR DESIGN RELY ON COSTLY OPERATION (TYPICALLY BITWISE OPERATIONS, LIKE XORING)

# HASHING AND ENCRYPTION

ONE SOLUTION IS ARITHMETIZATION-ORIENTED CONSTRUCTIONS, NEW PERMUTATIONS DESIGNED TO USE FIELD ELEMENTS (E.G RESCUE-PRIME\*)



Non-linear layers


Linear layers

Round constants

\* CREDITS TO THE RESCUE-PRIME SPECIFICATION BY ALAN SZEPÍENÉC, TOMER ASHUR AND SIEMEN DHOOGHE

# HASHING AND ENCRYPTION

THEN, USING THE **SAFE API\*** ALLOWS US TO TRANSFORM SAID PERMUTATIONS TO DIFFERENT CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES (AEAD, HASHING, MERKLE TREE, ETC.)



\* SAFE (SPONGE API FOR FIELD ELEMENTS) - PROPOSAL BY DMITRY KHOVRATOVICH ET. AL.

3. HOW CAN I USE ZK-SNARKS IN MY PROJECT ?

# DESIGN THE APPLICATION

PICK YOUR APPROACH

THE HARD WAY (WRITE THE CIRCUIT)  
POSSIBLE WITH A DSL (CIRCOM, LEO)  
OR A LOWER LEVEL LIBRARY

VS

USE AN EXISTING LIBRARY GADGET  
EASIER WITHOUT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE  
DONE IN CIRCOMLIB, HALO2, **ZEKROM**

DESCRIBE YOUR APP

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INPUTS  
CONSTANTS AND OUTPUTS  
OPERATIONS (ADD/MUL), CONSTRAINTS

## CHOOSE A PROVING SCHEME

SCHEME	VERIFY TIME	TRUSTED SETUP
GROTH 16	Constant, few ms	Per circuit
PLONK (2019)	Constant, few ms	Universal
Marlin (2019)	Constant, few ms	Universal
Halo2 (2020)	Variable, but in general short	Universal

ENJOY !

NOW USE THE API IN YOUR APP  
PERFORM THE SETUP PHASE IF NEEDED  
THEN PROVING AND VERIFYING STEPS

# UNDER THE HOOD

## ARITHMETIC CIRCUIT DEFINITION

- WE TRANSFORM OUR APPLICATION IN AN ARITHMETIC CIRCUIT WITH PUBLIC INPUTS [X], PRIVATE INPUTS [WITNESSES], GATES [ADD, MUL, CUSTOM], WIRES AND PUBLIC OUTPUTS.
- WE DECIDE HOW TO CONSTRAINT THE CIRCUIT E.G. A PUBLIC MESSAGE SHOULD BE EQUAL TO THE SECRET OUTPUT OF A HASH FUNCTION.

# UNDER THE HOOD

## ARITHMETIC CIRCUIT DEFINITION

- WE TRANSFORM OUR APPLICATION IN AN ARITHMETIC CIRCUIT WITH PUBLIC INPUTS [X], PRIVATE INPUTS [WITNESSES], GATES [ADD, MUL, CUSTOM], WIRES AND PUBLIC OUTPUTS.
- WE DECIDE HOW TO CONSTRAINT THE CIRCUIT E.G. A PUBLIC MESSAGE SHOULD BE EQUAL TO THE SECRET OUTPUT OF A HASH FUNCTION.

## ENCODING POLYNOMIALS

- THE CIRCUIT IS TRANSFORMED IN A SET OF CONSTRAINTS AND ENCODED IN INTERPOLATION POLYNOMIALS ACCORDING TO THE PARAMETERS OF THE CIRCUIT.

# UNDER THE HOOD

## ARITHMETIC CIRCUIT DEFINITION

- WE TRANSFORM OUR APPLICATION IN AN ARITHMETIC CIRCUIT WITH PUBLIC INPUTS [X], PRIVATE INPUTS [WITNESSES], GATES [ADD, MUL, CUSTOM], WIRES AND PUBLIC OUTPUTS.
- WE DECIDE HOW TO CONSTRAINT THE CIRCUIT E.G. A PUBLIC MESSAGE SHOULD BE EQUAL TO THE SECRET OUTPUT OF A HASH FUNCTION.

## ENCODING POLYNOMIALS

- THE CIRCUIT IS TRANSFORMED IN A SET OF CONSTRAINTS AND ENCODED INTO INTERPOLATION POLYNOMIALS ACCORDING TO THE PARAMETERS OF THE CIRCUIT.

## PROVING SYSTEM

- WE PROVE DIFFERENT PROPERTIES OF THE POLYNOMIALS USING A PCS AND AN [NON-INTERACTIVE] PROOF SYSTEM



# 4. ЗЕРКАЛО



# ZEKROM

## CONTEXT

ORIGINALLY A MASTER'S THESIS/RESEARCH PROJECT  
NOW RELEASED AS AN OPEN-SOURCE LIBRARY  
WITH THE GOAL TO BE FRIENDLY TOWARDS IMPLEMENTERS




## CAPABILITIES

SCHEMES: RESCUE-PRIME, GRIFFIN, NEPTUNE, REINFORCED CONCRETE & CIMINION  
PROVING SYSTEMS: GROTH16, MARLIN (ARKWORKS-RS), HALO2 (HALO2)  
TOOLS: BENCHMARK 101, CONSTANTS VERIFICATION  
EASE-OF-USE: HIGH-LEVEL API, CHOICES GUIDE AND RESEARCH ARTICLE

## TRY IT YOURSELF

[HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/KUDELSKISECURITY/ZEKROM-ARKWORKS](https://github.com/kudelskisecurity/zekrom-arkworks)  
[HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/KUDELSKISECURITY/ZEKROM-HALO2](https://github.com/kudelskisecurity/zekrom-halo2)  
[HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/KUDELSKISECURITY/ZEKROM-EXAMPLE](https://github.com/kudelskisecurity/zekrom-example)





# QUESTIONS

