

Netflow

Malicious activities detection

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Goal

Being able to detect (most of) malicious activities without having to read logs Logs are boring, reading them takes a lot of time

Graphic visualisation is more effective, fast and fun

Being able to detect some other activities (tor, worms, slow scan, tunnel ...) by scripts

Netflow/IPFIX/sFlow

NetFlow At first a Cisco technology on routers IPFIX IETF standard (RFC5101, RFC5102) IPFIX = NetFlow v10 sFlow

Very similar to NetFlow (softwares who collect/analyse are the same) Mostly implemented on switches

How it works

A flow is a set of packets with common characteristics within a given time frame and a given direction:

Ingress interface, L3 information (src/dst IP), L4 information (tcp/udp w src/dst ports, icmp, esp, ...)

Start time, duration, number of packets and bytes

A session (for example a HTTP file download) will produce two flows (inbound + outbound)

How it works

The cache contains 64k entries (default) A flow expires: After 15 seconds of inactivity (default) After 30 minutes of activity (default) When the RST or FIN flag is set If the cache is full

How it works

Routers/Switches send flows to collector (2055/udp)

Work with most of router/switch vendors (NetFlow or sFlow), even with OpenvSwitch or VMware vSphere

On Linux routers there is an iptables module ipt-netflow (I haven't tested it).

Many open source collectors are available We'll focus on nfdump/nfsen

Nfdump/Nfsen

Nfdump

Set of command line tools to collect (nfcapd), to search into flow (nfdump), and few other tools (replay flows for example) Nfsen

Web based graphic representation of flows Graphs are made using filters (something like pcap ones)

Graph activities by port, host, networks,...


Nfdump/Nfsen

The following examples are based on my university network (Lille)

- On the Wan Router
- 10 GB of flow data saved each month

Some examples

Profile: Eduroam




Eduroam wireless users (students, staff, guests)




Few servers


Graph by ports




Bytes



Packets




Flows



TCP Flows

Netflow Processing




** nfdump -M /opt/nfsen//profiles-data/live/upstream1 -T -R 2013/06/01/nfcapd.201306012055:2013/06/02/nfcapd.20130602
nfdump filter:

intuding filleoff.								
((ident upstream1) and (`							
In IF 3 and port 53	\mathbf{X}							
)								
or								
(ident upstream1) and (\mathbf{X}							
In IF 2 and port 53	\mathbf{X}							
)) and (proto TCP)	\sim							
Aggregated flows 65375	\sim	•						
Top 10 flows ordered by flows		<u> </u>						
Date flow start Durat	ion Src IP Addr	Dst IP Addr	Dst Pt	Packets	Bytes	bps	Bpp	Flows
2013-06-01 22:17:41.104 48722	656 178.32.36.67	194.254.131.202	53	168077	9.0 M	1476	53	167557
2013-06-01 22:17:41.260 48722	484 178.32.36.67	194.254.131.212	53	167731	9.0 M	1473	53	167232
2013-06-01 22:17:41.048 48722	792 178.32.36.67	194.254.131.211	53	167739	9.0 M	1473	53	167203
2013-06-01 22:17:41.580 48722	248 178.32.36.67	194.254.131.201	53	167606	8.9 M	1465	53	167068
2013-06-01 22:13:46.144 243	556 5.135.135.116	194.254.131.201	53	350	14000	459	40	350

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Cedric — cr

root@resolv1:~# tcpdump -i any -n port 53 and host 178.32.36.67 tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on any, link-type LINUX_SLL (Linux cooked), capture size 65535 bytes 12:25:29.188613 IP 178.32.36.67.59863 > 194.254.131.211.53: Flags [S], seg 2502899062, 12:25:29.588629 IP 178.32.36.67.61895 > 194.254.131.211.53: Flags [S], seg 1601764452, 12:25:29.708634 IP 194.254.131.201.53 > 178.32.36.67.61997: Flags [S.], seq 2144354060. 12:25:29.832639 IP 178.32.36.67.41147 > 194.254.131.211.53: Flags [S], seq 907639839, v 12:25:29.972644 IP 178.32.36.67.54752 > 194.254.131.211.53: Flags [S], seg 3715049031, 12:25:29.972644 IP 194.254.131.211.53 > 178.32.36.67.54752: Flags [S.], seg 2304855864, 12:25:30.044647 IP 178.32.36.67.47982 > 194.254.131.201.53: Flags [S], seg 451602765, v 12:25:30.140651 IP 178.32.36.67.46022 > 194.254.131.211.53: Flags [S], seq 3854503231, 12:25:30.248656 IP 178.32.36.67.58905 > 194.254.131.211.53: Flags [S], seg 3884103038, 12:25:30.408662 IP 178.32.36.67.56979 > 194.254.131.201.53: Flags [S], seg 1047819323, 12:25:30.500666 IP 194.254.131.211.53 > 178.32.36.67.61262: Flags [S.], seg 2274194013. 12:25:30.900682 IP 194.254.131.211.53 > 178.32.36.67.44921: Flags [S.], seg 2173305097. 12:25:31.020687 IP 178.32.36.67.42748 > 194.254.131.211.53: Flags [S], seg 2931397933,




Misconfiguration Open recursive DNS

Profile: Protocole




nmap /24


	Netflow Proce	ssing									
	Source:	Filter:			0	ptions:					
	dns	1			0)List Flows 💽 Sta	t TopN				
	autre-ip icmp				Т	'op: 10 :	;				
	autre Ssh				S	tat: SRC IP	Address	order	by flo	ws ‡	
	рор3				/ T	imit: Pa	ckets 🗧	> = 0			
1	All Sources	and <none> \$</none>	•					/ • 0		- •	
						utput: 🗌 / IP	v6 long				
								Clear	Form	process	
				•	/	•					
	<pre>ump -M /opt/nfsen/; filter:</pre>	/profiles-data/li	ive/upstream1 -T -	-R 2013/05/22/ni	fcapd.2013052	21705:2013/05/22/	nfcapd.20	130522172	0 -n 10	-s srcip/f	lows
((ide	ent upstreaml) and										
in IF))	3 and (proto tcp or	r proto udp) and	not (port 80 or po	ort 443 or port	53 or port 2	5 or port 487 or	port 465 (or port 9	93 or p	ort 22)	
Top 10	Src IP Addr order										
	irst seen 5-22 17:11:32.568	Duration Proto	Src IP Addr 88.191.150.63	Flows(%) 510321(96.7)	Packets(%) 511090(54.5	Bytes(%)) 22.5 M(6.7)	pps 948	bps 334013	bpp 44		
		117.040 any	42.82.130.100	2037(0.4)	2037(0.2		17	5569	40		
2013-0	5-22 17:04:47.804	1193.944 any	176.31.24.235	1852(0.4)	1852(0.2) 81488(0.0)	1	546	44		
2013-0	5-22 17:12:25.324	0.984 any	222.186.26.132	1024(0.2)	1024(0.1) 40960(0.0)	1040	333008	40		
	5-22 16:44:09.048		193.49.201.178	969(0.2)	268272(28.6		110	691731	782		
	5-22 17:05:22.524		193.49.201.173	520(0.1)	36836(3.9		31	166975	655		
		1198.496 any	173.194.78.125	460(0.1)	1088(0.1	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	0	1100	151		
	5-22 17:04:53.304		46.105.17.210	199(0.0)	199(0.0	, , ,	0	58	44		
	5-22 17:11:38.500 5-22 17:01:30.212	418.384 any	83.157.166.92 84.16.67.168	128(0.0) 124(0.0)	48331(5.2 7078(0.8	, , , ,	115 6	565004 67147	611 1226		
2010-0	5 22 17.01.00.212	roomin o uni	04.10.07.100	123(0.0)		, ., .,	0	0/13/	1000		




email account used to send spam




email account used to send spam



Bittorents (uTB)



Most scanned ports



Aggregated flows 43032	10								
Top 10 flows ordered b	y flows:	\backslash							
Date flow start	Duration	Src IP Addr	Dst Pt	Packets	Bytes	bps	Bpp	Flows	
2013-06-23 16:17:04.72	8 85968.864	188.143.233.172	80	709807	163.2 M	15185	229	91110	
2013-06-23 16:31:23.38	0 66811.216	212.68.55.14	445	87214	3.5 M	417	40	87211	
2013-06-23 18:31:55.76	4 77880.436	113.171.224.166	80	301167	28.9 M	2972	96	36155	
2013-06-23 16:09:29.32	8 80436.056	188.143.232.190	80	174426	41.8 M	4156	239	23467	
2013-06-23 16:06:33.48	0 86591.408	194.57.108.9	53	22606	1.6 M	148	71	22572	
2013-06-23 16:12:49.63	2 86023.340	188.143.233.150	80	113287	28.3 M	2628	249	16005	
2013-06-23 16:04:58.08	8 86652.080	188.143.232.127	80	85401	20.9 M	1932	245	11824	
2013-06-23 16:07:33.88	4 42866.720	188.143.233.138	80	79261	19.2 M	3591	242	10843	
2013-06-23 16:12:27.91	6 75593.144	188.143.233.9	80	65436	16.2 M	1709	246	9134	
2013-06-23 16:28:58.11	2 64634.712	89.248.171.125	53	7025	463650	57	66	7025	

Horizontal scan

Malicious activities detection by command line

Command line search

Tunnels

Very long flows with few traffic -> HTTP/HTTPS Tunnel

Big amount on data on UDP/53 -> DNS Tunnel

SSH Tunnel is harder to detect...

Malware or Tor traffic Use public list of IP addresses of CC / Tor Node

http://rules.emergingthreats.net/blockrules/emerging-tor-BLOCK.rules

root@mon2:~/tmp/test-nfdump# ruby convert-tor.rb < emerging-tor-BLOCK.rules > tor.txt
root@mon2:~/tmp/test-nfdump# nfdump -R /opt/nfsen//profiles-data/live/upstream1/2013/05/21/ -m -c 1000 'in IF 2 and
proto tcp and @include tor.txt' -A srcip,dstip,dstport | grep -v '1\$'

Date flow start	Duration	Src IP Addr	Dst IP Addr	Dst Pt	Packets	Bytes	bps	Врр	Flows	
2013-05-21 09:54:37.124	244.772	194.57.219.151	178.32.212.25	443	17	4897	160	288	3	
2013-05-21 10:25:06.744	308.320	194.57.219.151	78.108.63.44	443	81	20635	535	254	4	
2013-05-21 10:25:06.796	245.324	194.57.219.151	178.33.169.35	443	46	12088	394	262	3	
2013-05-21 10:25:28.180	247.048	194.57.219.151	96.47.226.21	443	44	11987	388	272	3	
2013-05-21 10:26:08.136	246.836	194.57.219.151	77.109.138.42	443	56	12650	409	225	3	
2013-05-21 10:26:08.140	246.988	194.57.219.151	173.254.216.66	443	48	12144	393	253	3	
2013-05-21 10:26:08.148	246.980	194.57.219.151	173.254.216.69	443	44	11981	388	272	3	
2013-05-21 10:26:08.168	246.624	194.57.219.151	109.163.233.202	443	52	12310	399	236	3	
2013-05-21 10:26:08.168	427.068	194.57.219.151	109.163.233.200	443	65	16342	306	251	5	
2013-05-21 10:30:01.508	262.188	195.83.93.127	96.47.226.20	43379	11	660	20	60	4	
2013-05-21 14:13:02.904	179.284	194.57.219.129	37.130.227.134	443	29	8136	363	280	3	
2013-05-21 14:13:03.116	180.136	194.57.219.129	178.33.169.35	443	30	8571	380	285	3	
2013-05-21 14:13:03.316	179.908	194.57.219.129	77.247.181.164	443	31	8282	368	267	4	
2013-05-21 14:14:08.680	289.376	194.57.219.129	78.108.63.44	443	3139	897930	24823	286	7	
2013-05-21 14:14:08.920	180.960	194.57.219.129	173.254.216.68	443	30	8581	379	286	3	
2013-05-21 14:14:08.932	251.368	194.57.219.129	96.47.226.21	443	47	14780	470	314	4	
2013-05-21 14:14:08.952	179.916	194.57.219.129	77.109.139.28	443	29	8533	379	294	3	
2013-05-21 14:15:20.476	179.696	194.57.219.129	178.32.210.159	443	29	8520	379	293	3	
2013-05-21 14:15:20.480	179.724	194.57.219.129	31.172.30.1	443	41	10679	475	260	3	
2013-05-21 14:23:41.156	617.928	194.57.219.151	91.213.8.236	443	29	10300	133	355	4	
2013-05-21 14:28:55.236	326.712	194.57.219.151	176.31.181.25	443	8	740	18	92	5	
2013-05-21 14:36:53.888	249.732	194.57.219.151	199.48.147.35	443	114	17604	563	154	3	
2013-05-21 14:37:54.944	250.188	194.57.219.151	31.172.30.2	443	46	12104	387	263	3	
2013-05-21 14:37:54.988	250.124	194.57.219.151	77.247.181.164	443	44	12019	384	273	3	
2013-05-21 14:37:54.992	257.108	194.57.219.151	46.149.17.40	443	13	3172	98	244	3	
2013-05-21 14:38:55.720	252.484	194.57.219.151	96.44.189.101	443	50	12247	388	244	3	
2013-05-21 14:41:59.372	65.188	194.57.219.151	31.172.30.1	443	29	8131	997	280	2	
2013-05-21 14:41:59.376	68.248	194.57.219.151	216.243.58.198	443	32	8241	966	257	2	
2013-05-21 14:44:00.796	64.200	194.57.219.151	109.163.233.205	443	19	5604	698	294	2	
2013-05-21 15:21:43.868	181.044	194.57.219.129	199.48.147.35	443	22	4769	210	216	3	
2013-05-21 15:21:43.868	180.084	194.57.219.129	31.172.30.3	443	23	5021	223	218	3	
2013-05-21 15:23:45.896	110.720	194.57.219.129	77.109.139.27	443	18	3787	273	210	3	

Detecting Tor use



Questions?

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