DNS Privacy dnsprivacy.org

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July 2017

Overview


- **The problem:** Why Internet privacy and DNS Privacy are important (DNS leakage)
- Recent Progress: Chart progress during last 3-4 years (DPRIVE) in open standards and open source software
- Where are we now? Present current status and tools

IETF Open Standards and Privacy

March 2011	I-D: Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols (IAB)		
June 2013	Snowdon revelations What timing!		
July 2013	RFC6973 : Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols		
	RFC7258: Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack:		
May 2014	"PM is an attack on the privacy of Internet users and organisations."		

DNS Privacy - A brief history

DNS is part of the Internet 'leaky boat' problem




DNS Privacy (in 2013)


- DNS is 30 year old! [RFC1034/5 (1987)]
 - Original design: availability, redundancy and speed!
 - DNS is an 'enabler'
- DNS standards:
 - UDP (99% of traffic to root)


DNS sent in clear text NSA: **MORECOWBELL**

- TCP only for 'fallback' (pre 2010)
- Perception: The DNS is public, right? It is not sensitive/personal information....it doesn't need to be protected/encrypted














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EDNS0 problem

• **RFC6891** (2013): Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)

Intended to enhance DNS protocol capabilities

 But... mechanism enabled addition of end-user data into DNS queries (non-standard options)

EDNS0 problem


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
 But... mechanism enabled addition of end-user data into DNS queries (non-standard options)

ISP justification:	Parental Filtering (per user)
CDN justification:	Faster content (geo location)


Parental Filtering



[User src address] MAC address or id in DNS query




[User src address] MAC address or id in DNS query Client Subnet (<u>RFC7871</u>) contains source subnet **in** DNS query




Even behind a NAT, do not have anonymity!

Even behind a recursive do not have anonymity!



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
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DNS: It's not just for names

- MX records (email domain)
- SRV records (services)
- OPENPGPKEY (email addresses)
- ...this is only going to increase....

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Root

tor .org

Juy 2017

- (AUTH) Who monitors or has access here ISP/ government/NSA/Passive DNS?
- (AUTH) Does my ISP sell my (anonymous) data?
- (UNAUTH) How safe is this data?

- When at home...
- When in a coffee shop...

Rec

DNS Privacy @ RMLL

12

12

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Root

• When at home...

DNS Privacy @ RMLL

• When in a coffee shop...

Rec

Auth for .org

Who monitors or has access here?

DNS - leakage

- Basic problem is leakage of meta data
 - Allows fingerprinting and re-identification of individuals
- Even without user meta data traffic analysis is possible based just on timings and cache snooping
- Operators see (and log) your
 DNS queries

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DNS Risk Matrix

	In-Flight		At Rest	
Risk	Stub => Rec	Rec => Auth	At Recursive	At Authoritative
Passive Monitoring				
Active Monitoring				
Other Disclosure Risks e.g. Data breaches				


DPRIVE WG et al.


IETF DPRIVE WG

<u>DPRIVE WG</u> create in 2014

<u>Charter</u>: Primary Focus is Privacy for Stub to recursive

- Why not tackle whole problem?
 - Don't boil the ocean, stepwise solution
 - Stub to Rec reveals most information
 - Rec to Auth is a particularly hard problem





Problem statement: RFC 7626

DNS Privacy Considerations: Expert coverage of risks throughout DNS ecosystem

Rebuts "alleged public nature of DNS data"

• The data may be public, but a DNS 'transaction' is not/should not be.

"A typical example from outside the DNS world is: the web site of Alcoholics Anonymous is public; the fact that you visit it should not be."

Stub/Rec Encryption Options

	Pros	Cons	
STARTTLS	 Port 53 Known technique Incrementation deployment 	 Downgrade attack on negotiation Port 53 - middleboxes blocking? Latency from negotiation 	
TLS (new port)	 New DNS port (no interference with port 53) Existing implementations 	 New port assignment Scalability? 	
DTLS (new port) (new port) (new port) (new port)	 Truncation of DNS messages (just like UDP) Fallback to TLS or clear text Can't be standalone solution 		

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Encrypted DNS 'TODO' list

- 1. Get a new port
- 2. DNS-over-TCP/TLS: Address issues in standards and implementations
- Tackle authentication of DNS servers (bootstrap problem)
- 4. What about <u>traffic analysis</u> of encrypted traffic msg size & timing still tell a lot!

Encrypted DNS 'TODO' list

1. Get a new port

Oct 2015 - port 853

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2. Fix DNS-over-TCP/TLS

Goal	How?
Optimise set up & resumption	RFC7413 : TFO Fast Open RFC5077 : TLS session resumption TLS 1.3 (0-RTT)
Amortise cost of TCP/TLS setup	RFC7766 (bis of RFC5966) - March 2016: Client pipelining (not one-shot!), Server concurrent processing, Out-of-order responses RFC7828: Persistent connections (Keepalive)
Servers handle many connections robustly	Learn from HTTP world!

3. Authentication in DNS-over-(D)TLS

- Internet-Draft: Usage Profiles
 - Strict
 - Opportunistic
- Authentication:
 - Name or SPKI pin (requires config)
 - DANE (I-D: TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension)

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Encrypt & Authenticate then
 Encrypt then
 Clear text

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
DPRIVE Solution Documents (stub to recursive)

Document	Date	Topic
<u>RFC7858</u>	May 2016	DNS-over-TLS
<u>RFC7830</u>	May 2016	4. EDNS0 Padding Option
<u>RFC8094</u>	Feb 2017	DNS-over-DTLS
<u>draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-</u> <u>tls-profiles</u>	IESG LC	Authentication for DNS-over-(D)TLS


*Category: Experimental

Other work....

DNS Disclosure Example 1



RFC7816: QNAME Minimisation



DNS-over-HTTP(S)

Avoids e.g. port 853 blocking

- Google: <u>DNS-over-HTTPS</u> (non-standard)
- Standards are in flux (many drafts....)
 - DNS wire-format over HTTP (tunnelling)

Implementations exist

• <u>DNS over HTTPS</u> (query origination)

Mix HTTPS/2 and DNS on one connection

DNS-over-QUIC

- DNS over dedicated QUIC connections
 - QUIC is a developing open source protocol (from Google) that runs over UDP (HTTPS/2-like)
 - ~35% of Google's egress traffic (~7% of Internet traffic)
 - Reliable, low latency, performant
 - Source address validation, no MTU limit
 - Encrypted

DNS Data handling

- Do you read the small print of your ISPs contract?
- More work/research needed in this area
 - Monitoring of government policy and practice
 - **Transparency** from providers on policy and breaches
 - Methods for **de-identification** of user data (e.g. DITL)
 - 'PassiveDNS' data used for research/security

DNS Data handling

- Do you read the small print of your ISPs contract?
- More work/research needed in this area
 - Mon Not always
 Tran technical solution: Needs more work!
 Meth Nethology
 - 'PassiveDNS' data used for research/security





Risk Mitigation Matrix

	In-Flight		At Rest	
Risk	Stub => Rec	Rec => Auth	At Recursive	At Authoritative
Passive monitoring	Encryption (e.g. TLS, HTTPS)	QNAME		
Active monitoring	Authentication & Encryption	Minimization		
Other Disclosure Risks e.g. Data breaches				etices (Policies) entification

DNS Privacy Implementation & Deployment

<u>dnsprivacy.org</u>



- DNS Privacy Project homepage
- Who? <u>Sinodun</u>, <u>NLnet Labs</u>, <u>Salesforce</u>,...
 (plus various grants and individual contributions)
- What? Point of reference for DNS Privacy services
 - Quick start guides for operators & end users
 - Ongoing work presentations, IETF, Hackathons
 - Tracking of DNS-over-TLS experimental servers

RECURSIVE

Server Side Solutions

- <u>Recursive (open source) implementations</u>
 - Unbound, Knot Resolver support DNS-over-TLS
- Using a pure TLS load balancer (with e.g. BIND)
 - NGINX, HAProxy, stunnel, docker image
 - Requested support in *dnsdist*
- Let's Encrypt certificate management automation



Experimental!

DNS-over-TLS Servers (all using Open Source)

Hosted by	Notes
NLnet Labs	Unbound
Surfnet (Sinodun)	BIND + HAProxy BIND + nginx
UncensoredDNS	Unbound
<u>dns.cmrg.net</u>	Knot Resolver

10 at last count - find details at: DNS Test Servers

RECURSIVE

Experimental!

Server monitoring

Project dnsprivacy-monitoring

* Green indicates success

* Red indicates failed test (this might result from non DNS related issues such server being off line, blocking from the probe location, etc.) Note that the 'Strict mode' tests could fail for a number of reasons including incorrect credentials, self-signed certificates for name only authentication, incompatible TLS version or Cipher suites, etc. The console log of the test may give more information.

* Grey indicates test not run (e.g. due to lack of available transport or the lack of the SPKI pin)

Authentication information is taken from https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/display/DP/DNS+Privacy+Test+Servers These tests use Stephane Bortzmeyer's nagios plugin - see https://github.com/bortzmeyer/monitor-dns-over-tls

Configuration Matrix		Responds over TLS	Strict mode - Name only	Strict mode - SPKI only	Certificate expiry > 0 days	Certificate expiry > 14 days	QNAME minimisation used
getdnsapi.net	v6		O	O	O	O	O
	v4		O	O	O	O	O
dnsovertls.sinodun.com	v6		O	O	S	O	0
	v4	e	O	O	O	O	0
dnsovertls1.sinodun.com	v6	S	S	S	S	O	0
	v4	S	S	S	S	O	0
dns.cmrg.net	v6	S	S	S	S	O	O
	v4	S	O	S	S	O	0
tls-dns-u.odvr.dns-	v6	S	0	0	S		0
oarc.net	v4	S	0	0	S		0
dns-resolver.yeti.eu.org	v6	S	S	S	S		S
	v4						
yeti-rr.datev.net	v6	S	S	S	S	O	S
	v4						
unicast.censurfridns.dk	v6	S	S		S	O	0
	v4	S	S		S	O	0
dns-tls.openbsd.se	v6						
	v4	O	O	O	O	0	0





Stubby



- A open source privacy enabling stub resolver: <u>User Guide</u>
- Available in <u>getdns</u> (1.1.1 release) open source
 - Run as daemon handling requests
 - Configure OS DNS resolution to point at *localhost*
 - DNS queries then proxied over TLS
 - Comes with config for experimental servers



Stubby Status

- Command line tool for 'advanced' users
 - Supports name and SPKI pinset authentication
 - Strict and Opportunistic profiles
- Homebrew formula, docker image, packages and macOS UI on the way..... (DNSSEC)



CLIENTS

SubbyUI preview

• • •	Stub	byManager	
Contraction of the second	Service Status:	running	Start Stop
7	DNS Servers:	🔽 Use Stubby DN	٧S
			n check this box and art using Stubby DNS.
		Hit the Stop button t DNS settings.	to return to default
			View the log
			Advanced
	Reve	rt to default	Revert Apply

CLIENTS

SubbyUl preview

StubbyManager	
Service Status: running Start Stop DNS Servers: Use Stubby DNS Start the service then check this box and Apply settings to start using Stubby DNS. Hit the Stop button to return to default DNS settings. View the log Advanced Revert to default Revert Apply	<pre>{ resolution_type: GETDNS_RESOLUTION_STUB , dns_transport_list: [GETDNS_TRANSPORT_TLS] , tls_authentication: GETDNS_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED , tls_query_padding_blocksize: 256 , edns_client_subnet_private : 1 , listen_addresses: [127.0.0.1, 0::1] , idle_timeout: 10000 , round_robin_upstreams: 1 , upstream_recursive_servers: [{ address_data: 145.100.185.15 , tls_auth_name: "dnsovertls.sinodun.com" , tls_pubkey_pinset: [{ digest: "sha256" , value: 621Ku9HsDVbyiPenApnc4sfmSYTHOVfFgL3pyB+cBL4= }] }, { address_data: 145.100.185.16 , tls_auth_name: "dnsovertls1.sinodun.com" , tls_pubkey_pinset: [{ digest: "sha256" , value: cE2ecALeE5B+urJhDrJlVFmf38cJLAvqekONvjvpqUA= }] }</pre>
	Validate Config Cancel OK

CLIENTS

SubbyUl preview

StubbyManager	
Service Status: running Start Stop DNS Servers: ✓ Use Stubby DNS Start the service then check this box and Apply settings to start using Stubby DNS. Hit the Stop button to return to default DNS settings. View the log Advanced Revert to default Revert Apply	<pre>{ resolution_type: GETDNS_RESOLUTION_STUB , dns_transport_list: [GETDNS_TRANSPORT_TLS] , tls_authentication: GETDNS_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED , tls_query_padding_blocksize: 256 , edns_client_subnet_private : 1 , listen_addresses: [127.0.0.1, 0::1] , idle_timeout: 10000 , round_robin_upstreams: 1 , upstream_recursive_servers: [{ address_data: 145.100.185.15 , tls_auth_name: "dnsovertls.sinodun.com" , tls_pubkey_pinset: [{ digest: "sha256"</pre>
	Stubby Log

[14:2/:20:240/20] STOPP1: 145:100.105:10	· com mic · mansport-ma = morme=acricc
[14:27:26.243898] STUBBY: 185.49.141.37	: Conn init : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:26.244161] STUBBY: 2001:610:1:40ba:145:100:185:15	: Conn init : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:26.244406] STUBBY: 2001:610:1:40ba:145:100:185:16	: Conn init : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:26.244740] STUBBY: 2a04:b900:0:100::37	: Conn init : Transport=TLS - Profile=Strict
[14:27:37.224439] STUBBY: 2a01:3a0:53:53::	: Conn closed : Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts= 0, Curr_auth=Success, Keepalive(ms)=10000
[14:27:37.224532] STUBBY: 2a01:3a0:53:53::	: Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts= 0, Best auth=Success
[14:27:37.224552] STUBBY: 2a01:3a0:53:53::	: Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Conns=1 ,Conn_fails= 0, Conn_shutdowns= 0, Backoffs=0
[14:27:37.224906] STUBBY: 89.233.43.71	: Conn closed : Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts= 0, Curr Auth=Success, Keepalive(ms)=10000
[14:27:37.224937] STUBBY: 89.233.43.71	: Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Resps=7 , Timeouts= 0, Best auth=Success
[14:27:37.224951] STUBBY: 89.233.43.71	: Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Conns=1 ,Conn fails= 0, Conn shutdowns= 0, Backoffs=0
[14:27:37.225137] STUBBY: 145.100.185.15	: Conn closed : Transport=TLS - Resps=8 , Timeouts= 0, Curr auth=Success, Keepalive(ms)=10000
[14:27:37.225170] STUBBY: 145.100.185.15	: Upstream stats: Transport=TLS - Resps=8 ,Timeouts= 0, Best_auth=Success

Stubby Usability

- DNS Privacy is a new paradigm for end users
- End users are a new paradigm for DNS people!
- 'Usable Security': Good GUIs aren't enough users still struggle with the basics if they don't understand what they are doing (HTTPS, PGP, DNSSEC)
- DNS Privacy uptake critically dependent on clients being usable + successful

Key challenges

- 1. Awareness!
- 2. Clients: OS integration of (more) client solutions
- 3. Usable client solutions for non-technical users
- 4. Increased deployment (anycast deployments)
- 5. Operator transparency in DNS data handling
- 6. Recursive to Authoritative....



Summary

- DNS Privacy is a real problem and more relevant than ever
- Active work on the large solution space
- Can use DNS Privacy today using Stubby & current experimental recursive servers
- More DNS Privacy services on the way...

Thank you!

Any Questions?

dnsprivacy.org